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20101-1422050920Progressive Management 2010. CD-ROM. New. 8166 pages. 5.60x5.10x0.40 inches. Progressive Management unknown
2022SKU1737831Independently published 2022-12-22. paperback. New. 8x1x11. New Textbook Ships with Tracking Independently published paperback
200514195Washington D.C. U.S.A.: United States Govt Printing Office 2005. Very large hardback in fine condition with fine dust jacket. Hardcover. Fine/Fine. Washington, D.C., U.S.A.: United States Govt Printing Office Hardcover
200652774Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy 2006. very good. 21 wraps color illus. figures. Inscribed by NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks on front cover. DOE/NA-0013. U.S. Department of Energy paperback
200475764Knoxville TN: U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration 2004. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Hardcover. Very good. Title from front cover. Various paginations approximately 225 pages. Illustrations some with color. Abbreviations and Acronyms. Includes CD on URPR Program Implementation and Task Plans dated January 2007 located inside the front cover. The University Research Program in Robotics URPR Implementation Plan is an integrated group of universities performing fundamental research that addresses broad-based robotics and automation needs of the NNSA Directed Stockpile Work DSW and Campaigns. The URPR mission is to provide improved capabilities of robotics science and engineering to meet the future needs of all weapon systems and other associated NNSA/DOE activities. The participants included University of Florida University of Michigan University of New Mexico University of Tennessee at Knoxville and University of Texas at Austin. This plan describes the purpose goals planning assumptions technical approach risks integration with other programs campaigns and sites and the estimated funding requirements for each year. The URPR mission is to provide improved capabilities of robotics science and engineering to meet the future needs of all weapon systems and other associated NNSA/DOE activities. The IRIS Lab's current areas of research are in scene building scene description and data visualization. The combination of these different fields gives rise to robust usable systems and advanced developments in the underlying technologies. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration hardcover
200288245Las Vegas NV: U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Operations Office 2002. Presumed to be one of some limited number of multiple originals produced. CD in a paper envelope with a clear plastic face. Very good. This disc has no distribution limitation information on its front. This CD contains one file with an approximately 70 page document that has color illustrations tabular data and briefing slides at the end. There may be a hardcopy version of this given the DOE/NV number. The content addresses the then current test readiness maintaining current posture enhancing test readiness and provided several appendixes including Threshold Test Ban Preparations and Authorization Basis including Underground Nuclear Test Standards Safety Basis Safety Management and a Device-Specific Nuclear Explosive Safety Study. Table 4 is a summary of the cost study results in Millions. The Department of Energy submitted a report to the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 20 calling for the United States to shorten the time it would take to conduct a nuclear test to 18 months in order to provide a "reasonable level of flexibility" for the Bush administration. Congress requested the report in November 2002 instructing Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham to draw up plans that would enable the department to test within six 12 18 or 24 months. Currently the United States can conduct a nuclear test within 24-36 months of a presidential directive to do so. Congress also asked Abraham to determine in consultation with the secretary of defense which readiness period would be optimal. The 18-month recommendation "reflects what is achievable and cost effective" according to the report which was prepared by the National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA a semiautonomous agency within the Energy Department. The report indicated that 18 months is the minimum amount of time needed to evaluate a problem identified in the U.S. nuclear stockpile propose a solution and "execute a test that would provide the information needed to certify the ‘fix.'" The recommendation is "consistent with realistic testing schedules" established during previous U.S. nuclear testing which ceased in 1992. By contrast shortening test readiness to six or 12 months would require a "substantial diversion of personnel and facilities at the laboratories" according to the report. That would "represent a major redirection of the stockpile stewardship program" which is intended to maintain the nuclear arsenal in the absence of testing. Adopting a testing posture of a year or less would be "most relevant.if the President might direct that testing resume for political reasons." The report also noted that the shorter readiness period would be considerably more expensive. The transition to shorten the current 24-36 month readiness posture expected to take three years is already underway. NNSA conducted an Enhanced Test Readiness Cost Study in July 2002 to determine the steps and funding required to shorten the readiness posture and the Nuclear Weapons Council a consultative group of officials from the Energy Department and the Pentagon approved the plan to transition to an 18-month readiness window in September 2002 according to the report. The Bush administration asked for funds to begin moving to a shorter test readiness posture in its fiscal year 2004 budget request. Charles Anson Franklin NNSA spokesman said that the current readiness posture of 24-36-months was "a policy decision of the previous administration. This administration has made a policy decision of an 18-month readiness period." He added "It's been out there—it's not been a surprise.We've been talking about moving to an 18-month readiness posture since 2001." The changes will be fully implemented by the end of fiscal year 2005 and will cost $83 million with an additional $25-30 million needed annually to sustain the heightened state of scientific technological and personnel preparedness according to the report. The report examined a speedier transition but concluded that reaching the 18-month readiness posture sooner would cost more and disrupt other programs because of the limited number of nuclear weapons personnel. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Operations Office unknown
200247207Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy 2002. very good. Approx. 500 wraps 2-vol. set illus. maps appendices references glossary index. Complete title: Final environmental impact statement for the proposed relocation of Technical Area 18 capabilities and materials at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Volume I contains chapters 1 through 11; Volume II contains Appendices A through K references and glossary. U.S. Department of Energy paperback
2023SKU1708778Independently Published 2023-12-19. paperback. Good. 8x2x10. Textbook May Have Highlights Notes and/or Underlining BOOK ONLY-NO ACCESS CODE NO CD Ships with Tracking Independently Published paperback
2023SKU1713495Independently Published 2023-12-19. paperback. New. 8x2x10. New Book Ships with Tracking Independently Published paperback
201875547Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration and U. K. Ministry of Defence 2018. Presumed First Edition First printing. Wraps. Very good. 3 38 3 plus covers. Timeline. Illustrations many in color. Maps. The 1958 US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement or UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement is a bilateral treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom on nuclear weapons cooperation. The treaty's full name is Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. It allows the United States and the UK to exchange nuclear materials technology and information. While the US has nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries including France and some NATO countries this agreement is by far the most comprehensive. Harold Macmillan called it "the Great Prize". The treaty was signed on 3 July 1958 after the Soviet Union shocked the American public with the Sputnik crisis on 4 October 1957 and the British hydrogen bomb programme successfully tested a hydrogen bomb in the Operation Grapple test on 8 November 1957. The Anglo-American Special Relationship proved mutually beneficial although it was never one of equals; the United States was far larger than Britain both militarily and economically. Britain soon became dependent on the United States for its nuclear weapons as it lacked the resources to produce a range of designs. The treaty allowed American nuclear weapons to be supplied to Britain through Project E for the use by the Royal Air Force and British Army of the Rhine. The treaty provided for the sale to the UK of one complete nuclear submarine propulsion plant plus ten years' supply of enriched uranium to fuel it. Other nuclear material was also acquired from the United States under the treaty. including 7.5 tonnes of highly enriched uranium although much of the highly enriched uranium was used as fuel for the growing fleet of UK nuclear submarines. The treaty paved the way for the Polaris Sales Agreement and the Royal Navy ultimately acquired entire weapons systems with the UK Polaris programme and Trident nuclear programme using American missiles with British nuclear warheads. The treaty has been amended and renewed nine times. The most recent renewal extended it to 31 December 2024. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration and U. K. Ministry of Defence paperback
2022x-1778268803stanfordpub.com 2022. Hardcover. New. 524 pages. 8.50x1.13x11.00 inches. stanfordpub.com hardcover
2022x-1778268811stanfordpub.com 2022. Paperback. New. 524 pages. 11.00x8.50x1.05 inches. stanfordpub.com paperback
200652773Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy 2006. Presumed First Edition/First Printing. Wraps. very good. 21 pages. Wraps illus. some in color acronyms. Signed by NNSA Administrator Linton Brooks on page iii. DOE/NA-0014. U.S. Department of Energy paperback
20192-1089643381Independently published 2019. Paperback. New. 695 pages. 11.69x8.27x1.74 inches. Independently published paperback
201374122Washington DC: United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration 2013. Presumed First thus. Coin. Very good. The Joint Verification Experiments occurred in 1988. One occurred in the U.S. and one in Russia. A 25th anniversary commemoration was held at the National Nuclear Security Site formerly the Nevada Test Site in 2013. This coin was given out to a select few participants officials and organizers. Coin has a 1.5 inch diameter. On one side the center image is the Department of Energy logo with two outer rings with text. The outermost ring text is "Building Trust and Confidence National Nuclear Security Admiistration" The other side has a center image with the dates 1988-2013 Russian and U.S. flags and the atomic symbol and an outer ring with the following text "25th Aniversary U.S.-Russia Joint Verification Experiment". Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Conduct of a Joint Verification Experiment May 31 1988. Reaffirming the statement of the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of December 9 1987 Proceeding from the agreement to conduct a joint Verification Experiment hereinafter referred to as JVE for the purpose of the elaboration of effective verification measures for the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests hereinafter referred to as the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests the parties have agreed in part as follows: 1. For purposes of the JVE there shall be two nuclear explosions one at the U.S. Nevada Test Site and one at the USSR Semipalatinsk Test Site each hereinafter being referred to as a JVE explosion. 2. The planned yield of the JVE explosion at each test site shall be not less than 100 kilotons and shall approach 150 kilotons. 3. Each Party shall have the opportunity to measure on the basis of reciprocity the yield of the JVE explosion conducted at the other Party's test site using teleseismic methods and at the other's test site using hydrodynamic yield measurement methods. 4. Each Party shall also perform teleseismic measurements with its national seismic station network for both JVE explosions. To assist in teleseismic measurement the Parties shall exchange data on five nuclear explosions conducted after January 1 1978 but before January 1 1988 to include yield date and time geographic coordinates depth of burial and associated geological and geophysical data. For each of these historical explosions the Parties shall exchange teleseismic recordings taken at five designated stations on each side including station corrections and the best network seismic magnitude. 5. Each Party shall perform hydrodynamic yield measurements within the satellite hole provided for that purpose of the JVE explosions at both Parties' test sites using the methods it has identified in this Agreement. DONE at Moscow on May 31 1988 in two copies each in the English and Russian languages both texts being equally authentic. FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA George P. Shultz FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS E. Shevardnadze. United States, Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
200276354Washington DC: United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs 2002. Presumed First Edition First printing. Wraps. Very good. iv 55 3 pages. Illustrations. Acronyms & Abbreviations. Glossary. This type of document is very ephemeral and it is believed that very few copies have survived in the more than two decades since it was issued. The United States government's Strategic Computing Initiative funded research into advanced computer hardware and artificial intelligence from 1983 to 1993. The initiative was designed to support various projects that were required to develop machine intelligence in a prescribed ten-year time frame from chip design and manufacture computer architecture to artificial intelligence software. The project was superseded in the 1990s by the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative and then by the Advanced Simulation and Computing Program. These later programs did not include artificial general intelligence as a goal but instead focused on supercomputing for large scale simulation such as atomic bomb simulations. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program or ASC is a super-computing program run by the National Nuclear Security Administration in order to simulate test and maintain the United States nuclear stockpile. The program was created in 1995 in order to support the Stockpile Stewardship Program or SSP. The goal of the initiative is to extend the lifetime of the current aging stockpile. Among the sections in the Table of Contents are: Stockpile Stewardship Defense Applications Computer Science Integrated Computing Systems Strategic Alliances Verification and Validation Physics Modeling Weapons Simulation Modeling and Simulation Level 1 Milestones High Explosives Advanced Visualization Detonation Wave Titan IV Solid Rocket Motor Metropolis Center JCEL. United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Programs paperback
200677506Washington DC: United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Military Application and Stockpile Operations Office of Stockpile Technology 2006. Presumed First Edition First printing. Spiral bound. Very good. Clear plastic sheet protects front and back covers. 2 vi 48 pages printed on one side only. Acronyms and Abbreviations. Chemicals and Units of Measure. Figures. Tables. References. Appendix A--Uranium Resource Classification System. Appendix B-- Nuclear Fuel Sources Evaluation; B.1 Evaluation Methodology and Results; B.2 Definition of Uranium Source Evaluation Terms. The strategic importance of assuring a supply of tritium constitutes the impetus for this analysis to identify a 40-year supply of nuclear fuel for the nuclear power plants used to produce tritium concurrently with the generation of civilian nuclear power. Assuring the nuclear fuel supply for those plants is one component of demonstrating that DOE can provide tritium for U.S. nuclear weapons with a high degree of confidence. Ms. Nanette D. Founds was listed as the Tritium Readiness Subprogram Manager Diversification is a prudent approach to achieving the highest probability of success in ensuring a long-term nuclear fuel supply because it reduces reliance on one source or technology and allows for flexibility to accommodate the dynamic nuclear fuel market. For a diversified mix of acceptable nuclear fuel supply sources the analysis recommended that NNSA take a series of specified actions to ensure the highest possible confidence in a 40-year nuclear fuel supply for the nuclear power plants then currently employed in the production of tritium for the National Nuclear Security Administration. Among the steps advocated included: allocation of a portion of the DOE inventory of depleted uranium hexafluoride use of market-based uranium procurement procedures to swap or barter for uranium appropriate for use for the tritium program and traditional procurement of U.S.-origin uranium. United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Military Application and Stockpile Operations, Off unknown
200475433United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2004. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. DVD. Very good. DVD has 40 files and many of them are folders. On July 13-14 2004 the Caltech ASC Level 1 Center hosted an ASC TriLab V&V Workshop in La Jolla CA to discuss and compare what the NNSA laboratories and the ASC Level 1 University Centers are learning with respect to code verification and validation. About 50 people participated in the workshop. Presentations were organized into four sessions and moderated by key V&V personnel from the NNSA labs and ASC Centers: 1 V&V Program Overviews Jamileh Soudah ASC HQ - Chair 2 Code and Solution Verification Tomek Plewa University of Chicago Flash Center - Chair 3 Validation Experiments Dan Meiron Caltech ASC Center - Chair 4 Validation and Uncertainty Quantification Tony Giunta Sandia - Chair The workshop began with V&V overviews presented by speakers from Los Alamos Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories and the ASC Level 1 Alliance Centers at Caltech the University of Chicago the University of Illinois Stanford University and the University of Utah. These baseline presentations were followed by talks addressing approaches and lessons learned in code and solution verification designing and implementing validation experiments and what has been accomplished and remains to be done in uncertainty qualification. At the end of the workshop Dan Meiron Caltech hosted a discussion to summarize commonalities across the lab and university programs and identify collaborative efforts that might follow this workshop. The workshop began with V&V overviews presented by speakers from Los Alamos Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories and the ASC Level 1 Alliance Centers at Caltech the University of Chicago the University of Illinois Stanford University and the University of Utah. These baseline presentations were followed by talks addressing approaches and lessons learned in code and solution verification designing and implementing validation experiments and what has been accomplished and remains to be done in uncertainty qualification. At the end of the workshop Dan Meiron Caltech hosted a discussion to summarize commonalities across the lab and university programs and identify collaborative efforts that might follow this workshop. The purpose of this document is to provide a synopsis of the key issues discussed during the workshop. The intent is not to review the substance of the technical presentations which are available from the Caltech V&V Workshop web site and CD but to provide a record of the important issues raised during the workshop discussion and interaction. Input for this synopsis comes primarily from the summary session moderated by Dan Meiron and notes taken during the course of the workshop sessions. United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown
200659608Washington DC: United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administra 2006. Wraps. Good. No dust jacket. Signed on front cover by Thomas D'Agostino Senate Confirmed Presidential Appointee Administrator of the NNSA. Some wear. 21 p. Illustrations. Title from cover. DOE/NA-0013. This is a precursor to the current Complex Transformation planning activities which includes a massive Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement and associated activities. This is a major defining document related to approaches to upgrade modernize and improve the nation's nuclear weapon design and production capabilities. United States, Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administra paperback
200569058Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2005. Presumed first edition/first printing. Very good. Includes illustrations. CD-ROM In 2005 the Nation's nuclear weapons enterprise put forth a vision for evolving the program and its design and production facilities and the underlying technologies and infrastructure for the coming quarter century. This CD-ROM contains information on this vision. From the NNSA website: "The NNSA was established by Congress in 2000 as a separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy responsible for the management and security of the nation s nuclear weapons nuclear nonproliferation and naval reactor programs. In 2002 NNSA reorganized removing a layer of management by eliminating its regional operations offices in New Mexico California and Nevada. Contract and project management oversight responsibility for NNSA s labs plants and special facilities was given to the site offices. NNSA headquarters retained responsibility for strategic and program planning budgeting and oversight of research development and nonproliferation activities. NNSA is responsible for the management and security of the nation s nuclear weapons nuclear nonproliferation and naval reactor programs. It also responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad. Additionally NNSA federal agents provide safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons and components and special nuclear materials along with other missions supporting the national security. NNSA relies on contractors to manage day-to-day site operations and to adhere to Department of Energy policies when operating the laboratories production plants and other facilities within the complex. Together the facilities implement NNSA s all-encompassing Stockpile Stewardship program that includes operations associated with surveillance assessment maintenance refurbishment manufacture and dismantlement of the nuclear weapons stockpile as well as research and development and certification efforts." National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown
201773761Albuquerque NM: United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2017. Presumed First Edition First printing if Issue B. Spiral bound. Very good. Various paginations approximately 150 pages. Illustrations. Some pages laminated. This Compilation includes Level 2 Federal Requirements Level 3 Contractor Agreements and Tools for Product Realization. The Defense Programs Business Process System DPBPS Portal as the mechanism for implementing DOE Order O 452.3 Management of the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex. The Portal delivers business requirements and processes specific to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs DP for directing managing operating and executing programs at the nuclear weapons production facilities and laboratories within the Nuclear Security Enterprise NSE. The DPBPS shall be the official web-based repository housing the business requirements processes and tools to perform DP activities within the Enterprise. M&O Contractors develop Level 4 content to specify and further details needed for site compliance. b. Content posted in the DPBPS shall become contractually binding on the effective date informed through the Site Impact Analysis T014 process and authorized by the PADAMA. NNSA publishes the content after PADAMA authorization and before the effective date to allow contractors time to bring site-specific processes into compliance. The DPBPS' content apply to all federal organizations responsible for maintaining and enhancing the safety reliability and performance of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile including the ability to design produce and test in order to meet national security requirements. Field Office Contracting Officers are responsible for including this policy in the Managing & Operating M&O Contractor contracts for the National Security Enterprise sites. The Contractor Requirements Document CRD sets forth requirements of this directive that apply to contracts. The CRD must be included in contracts of National Security Enterprise M&O Contractor sites performing work under the Defense Programs. United States, Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown
201774294Washington DC: United States. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration 2017. Presumed First Edition First printing. Wraps. Very good. vi 203 1 pages. Illustrations. Acronyms. References. Format us approximately 8.5 inches by 11 inches. Cover has slight wear and soiling. This is the final report on the NNSA's Security Roadmap Key Strategy 4 Develop and Sustain a Highly Capable Security Workforce. The report is the culmination of a year's work by a team of Industrial Organizational Leadership Development professionals from the National Training Center NNSA's Office of Human Capital Management and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The report is a comprehensive states of how the NNSA can significantly improve the recruitment development maturation and retention of the security professional. The report was designed to address the whole-person in that the report uses a competency-modeling concept as a key predictor in human performance. The next steps will include teaming to actively work the approved recommendations as well as establishing working groups to develop action plans for achieving success of each recommendation. The National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA is the U.S. agency responsible for enhancing national security through the military application of nuclear science. NNSA maintains and enhances the safety security and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear explosive testing; works to reduce the global danger from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the U.S. and abroad. Established by the United States Congress in 2000 NNSA is a semi-autonomous agency within the United States Department of Energy. The National Nuclear Security Administration was created by Congressional action in 1999 in the wake of the Wen Ho Lee spy scandal and other allegations that lax administration by the Department of Energy had resulted in the loss of U.S. nuclear secrets to China. Originally proposed to be an independent agency NNSA gained the reluctant support of the Clinton administration only after it was instead chartered as a sub-agency within the Department of Energy to be headed by an administrator reporting to the Secretary of Energy. The first NNSA administrator appointed was Air Force General and CIA Deputy Director John A. Gordon. NNSA has four missions with regard to national security: · To manage the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile. · To reduce global danger from weapons of mass destruction and to promote international nuclear safety and nonproliferation. · To provide the United States Navy with safe militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants and to ensure the safe and reliable operation of those plants. · To support United States leadership in science and technology. United States. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration paperback
200359621Washington DC: U. S. Department of Energy 2003. Wraps. Very good. No dust jacket. Removed from shrinkwrap for cataloguins. Includes a "Dear Interested Party" distribution letter. 3 volume set. 3 volume set. Includes: illustrations maps. Various paginations. Includes a Summary 57 pages and 2 volumes. Volume I approximately 700 pages; Volume II approximately 200 pages. DOE/EIS-236-S2. The National Nuclear Security Administration is responsible for the safety and reliability of the U. S. nuclear weapons stockpile including production readiness required to maintain that stockpile. This document addresses issues associated with constructing a new facility for the manufacturing of a key nuclear weapon component. This proposed facility proved to be controversial and did not recieve Congressional support and funding. However it retains significant value as a source of unclassified information about the use of plutonium and associated plutonium operations in the United States nuclear weapon program. U. S. Department of Energy paperback
200268511Washington DC: United States Department of Energy 2002. Presumed first edition/first printing. Wraps. Very good. No dust jacket. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Includes: illustrations diagrams index. 2 volumes. Volume 1 Chapters 1 throught 11 approximately 350 pages; Volume 2 Appendices A through K approximately 200 pages. Various paginations. References. Glossary. TA-18 supported important defense nuclear safety and other national security mission responsibilities. The operations at TA-18 enabled DOE personnel to gain knowledge and expertise in advanced nuclear technologies that supported: nuclear materials management criticality safety; emergency response in support of counterterrorism activities nuclear safeguards arms control; and criticality experiments. Technical Area 18 housed at the time the Western Hemisphere's largest collection of machines for conducting nuclear safety evaluations. Under the right conditions at Techncial Area 18 usingfissile material experiments capable of maintaining a self-sustaining nuclear fission chain reaction had been achieved. As part of the national response to the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks the Department of Energy proposed to relocate the Technical Area 18 operational capabilities and materals to a new location. This environmental impact statement was part of that process. United States Department of Energy paperback
201776194Washington DC: United States National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs 2017. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Wraps. Very good. Various paginations approximately 400 pages. Figures. Tables. Appendices. List of Acronyms. This had previously been Marked Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information but this marking has been struck through on every page where it had appeared. The National Nuclear Security Administration requires a sustained production capacity of no fewer than 80 pits per year PPY by 2030. NNSA is developing and installing capability at LANL in Plutonium Facility PF-4 to produced 30 ppy by 2026. The Analysis of Alternatives AOA for meeting pit production requirements completed in September 2017 assessed alternatives to close this identified mission gap in the NNSA's pit production capability. The AoA is a post Critical Decision CD-0 pre-CD-1 activity to identify a preferred alternative for conceptual design in preparation for the Deputy Secretary of Energy to make a program decision at CD-1. The pit named after the hard core found in fruits such as peaches and apricots is the core of an implosion nuclear weapon - the fissile material and any neutron reflector or tamper bonded to it. Some weapons tested during the 1950s used pits made with U-235 alone or in composite with plutonium but all-plutonium pits are the smallest in diameter and have been the standard since the early 1960s. Between 1954 and 1989 pits for US weapons were produced at the Rocky Flats Plant; the plant was later closed due to numerous safety issues. In 1996 the pit production was also relocated to Los Alamos. The current LANL production of new pits is limited to about 20 pits per year though NNSA is pushing to increase the production for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. The US Congress however has repeatedly declined funding. Up until around 2010 Los Alamos National Laboratory had the capacity to produce 10 to 20 pits a year. United States, National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Programs paperback
