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199779427Washington DC: General Accounting Office National Security and International Division June 1997. Presumed First Edition First printing White cover not usual blue cover--reprint/. Wraps. Good. 235 pages. Oversized book measuring 11 inches by 8/1-2 inches. Postage sticker and part of a shipping label roughly removed on rear cover. This report is the unclassified version of a classified report that the General Accounting Office issued in July 1996 on the Operation Desert Storm air campaign. At the request of John D. Dingell the Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on Commerce House of Representatives the Department of Defense reevaluated the security classification of the original report and as a result about 85 percent of the material originally determined to be classified has subsequently been determined to be unclassified and is presented in this report. The best available data did not permit GAO to either: 1 make a comprehensive system-by-system quantitative comparison of aircraft and weapon effectiveness; or 2 validate some of the key performance claims for certain weapon systems. Pursuant to Congressional direction GAO reviewed the Operation Desert Storm air campaign focusing on the: 1 use and performance of aircraft munitions and missiles employed during the air campaign; 2 validity of Department of Defense DOD and manufacturer claims particularly those for weapon systems utilizing advanced technology; 3 relationship between cost and performance of weapon systems; and 4 extent that Desert Storm air campaign objectives were met. GAO noted that: 1 air power clearly achieved many of Desert Storm's objectives but fell short of fully achieving others; 2 the available quantitative and qualitative data indicate that air power damage to several major target sets was more limited than DOD's title V report to the Congress stated; 3 these data show clear success against the oil and electrical target categories but less success against Iraqi air defense command control and communications and lines of communication; 4 success against nuclear-related mobile Scud and Republican Guard targets was the least measurable; 5 the lessons that can be learned from Desert Storm are limited because of the unique conditions the strike tactics employed by the coalition the limited Iraqi response and limited data on weapon system effectiveness; 6 the strong likelihood of campaign success enabled U.S. commanders to favor strike tactics that maximized aircraft and pilot survivability rather than weapon system effectiveness; 7 the Iraqis employed few if any electronic countermeasures and presented almost no air-to-air opposition; 8 as a result Desert Storm did not consistently or rigorously test all the performance parameters of aircraft and weapon systems used in the air campaign; 9 many of DOD's and manufacturers' postwar claims about weapon system performance were overstated misleading inconsistent with the best available data or unverifiable; 10 aircraft and pilot losses were historically low partly owing to the use of medium- to high-altitude munition delivery tactics that nonetheless both reduced the accuracy of guided and unguided munitions and hindered target identification and acquisition; 11 air power was inhibited by the limited ability of aircraft sensors to identify and acquire targets the failure to gather intelligence on critical targets and the inability to collect and disseminate battle damage assessments BDA in a timely manner; 12 the contributions of guided weaponry incorporating advanced technologies and their delivery platforms were limited because the cooperative operating conditions they require were not consistently encountered; 13 the important contributions of stealth and laser-guided bombs were emphasized as was the need for more and better BDA and less attention was paid to the significant contributions of less-sophisticated systems and the performance of critical tasks such as the identification and acquisition of targets; and 14 there was no apparent link between the cost of aircraft and munitions and their performance in Desert Storm. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Division paperback
199567164Washington DC: United States Congress General Accounting Office 1995. Presumed First Edition/first printing. Wraps. Very good. Pencil ersasure residue on first page. 109 p. Includes illustrations. In the early morning of February 27 1991 during the Persian Gulf War Army Corporal Douglas Lance Fielder was unintentionally killed by U. S. soldiers who had mistaken him and his fellow engineers as the enemy. GAo was requested to determine the events that had led to the fratricide assess the adequacy of U.S. Army investigations following that fratricide and investigate allegations that Army officials hindered invistigations of the fratricide incident or influenced their outcome. From Wikipedia: "Fratricide from the Latin words frater "brother" and cida "killer " or cidum "a killing " both from caedere "to kill to cut down" is the act of a person killing his or her brother.Fratricide may also be used to refer to friendly fire incidents. It also refers to the possible destruction of one MIRV warhead by another. Targets may be arranged deliberately to increase the likelihood in a strategy called dense pack." Also from Wikipedia: "The Gulf War 2 August 1990 28 February 1991 codenamed Operation Desert Storm 17 January 1991 28 February 1991 was a war waged by a U.N. -authorized Coalition force from 34 nations led by the United States against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The war is also known under other names such as the Persian Gulf War First Gulf War Gulf War I or the First Iraq War before the term "Iraq War" became identified instead with the 2003 Iraq War also referred to in the U.S. as "Operation Iraqi Freedom". Kuwait's invasion by Iraqi troops that began 2 August 1990 was met with international condemnation and brought immediate economic sanctions against Iraq by members of the U.N. Security Council. U.S. President George H. W. Bush deployed U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia and urged other countries to send their own forces to the scene. An array of nations joined the Coalition. The great majority of the Coalition's military forces were from the U.S. with Saudi Arabia the United Kingdom and Egypt as leading contributors in that order. Saudi Arabia paid around US$36 billion of the US$60 billion cost. The war was marked by the beginning of live news on the front lines of the fight with the primacy of the U.S. network CNN. The war has also earned the nickname Video Game War after the daily broadcast images on board the U.S. bombers during Operation Desert Storm. The initial conflict to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial bombardment on 17 January 1991. This was followed by a ground assault on 24 February. This was a decisive victory for the Coalition forces who liberated Kuwait and advanced into Iraqi territory. The Coalition ceased their advance and declared a cease-fire 100 hours after the ground campaign started. Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq Kuwait and areas on Saudi Arabia's border. Iraq launched Scud missiles against Coalition military targets in Saudi Arabia and against Israel." United States, Congress, General Accounting Office paperback
199991247Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1999. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 38 pages. Illustration. Tabular Data. Footnotes. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". When completed around 2004 the goal of the International Space Station ISS is to provide the United States and its international partners with an Earth orbiting facility that supports human habitation and scientific research in a microgravity environment. Because of Russia's ongoing problems in funding its share of the space station's construction costs the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA is concerned that Russia may also not be able to fulfill its commitments to fund ISS operations costs. NASA estimated that the annual cost to operate the completed space station will average $1.3 billion or $13 billion over a 10-year mission life. NASA anticipates sharing these costs with its international partners and it hopes to further reduce funding requirements through sharing with commercial users or through more efficient commercial operations. As requested by you and the late Representative George E. Brown Jr. we reviewed NASA's estimate for the cost to operate the space station after assembly is completed. Specifically we were asked to determine 1 if any space station-related costs are not included in NASA's estimate; 2 the level of uncertainty in the cost estimate for operations especially with regard to the potential impact of changes in Russian participation; and 3 how NASA funding requirements will be reduced by sharing costs with international partners or through commercial use and operations. NASA's $1.3 billion estimate does not include all funding requirements related to space station operations. NASA does not prepare budget estimates on a full-cost basis because it has not completed implementation of its full cost accounting system. Additional items that will have to be funded in the future within the space station budget include costs for upgrading obsolete systems and operating an alternative propulsion module. NASA has not developed detailed estimates for potential upgrades to combat component obsolescence and improve performance but space station officials believe that a robust enhancement program could cost $100 million or more per year. NASA has not estimated the cost of operating an alternative propulsion module being procured to provide reboost if Russia is unable to provide that function. Items that we determined to be space station-related that are funded in other NASA budget lines include space shuttle flights civil service personnel principal investigators and space communications; these are estimated to cost a total of $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2004. When NASA implements full cost accounting in 2001 some costs currently in other NASA budget lines will be included in the space station budget. In commenting on our draft report NASA stated that shuttle flights should be allocated to the overall cost of operating the space station using a marginal cost of $84 million per flight rather than an average cost of $435 million. We believe the average cost per flight more accurately represents NASA resources related to operating the space station. There is a high degree of uncertainty in NASA's estimate for the cost to operate the space station from 2005 to 2014. NASA's original estimate of $13 billion for operating the space station was developed to aid in evaluating life-cycle costs of redesign options rather than to accurately forecast budget needs. This estimate did not consider end-of-mission costs for either extending the life of the space station beyond 10 years or decommissioning it. The estimate was also developed for an earlier space station configuration that has since been modified. NASA does not prepare detailed budget estimates for the space station and other programs beyond fiscal year 2004 the last year of its current 5-year budget-planning period. NASA recently began an effort to review its operations cost estimate and develop a long-range funding profile that would better reflect annual requirements over the 10-year operations period. Adding to the uncertainty of future costs the full impact on operations if Russia is unable to fulfill its obligations is not known at this time. NASA would incur costs to operate an alternative propulsion module but does not yet know whether there will be a shortfall in Russian logistics flights or how such a shortfall would be spread among the shuttle and international partner resupply vehicles. United States General Accounting Office paperback
199168570Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1991. Presumed first edition/first printing. Wraps. Very good. No dust jacket. Cover has slight wear and soiling. 166 p. Includes illustrations. Footnotes. In February 1991 GAO sponsored a conference "U.S. Communications Policy: Issues for the 1990s " in response to increasing congressional interest in this area. The conference brought together government officials academicians and industry executives to explore and debate four critical policy issues in a series of round table discussions: how communications infrastructure should develop; the role of communications policy in promoting economic growth; allocations of the electromagnetic spectrum to support the growth of communications services; and whether the U.S. communications regulatory structure was effective. In preparing this publication the GAO relied primarily on information developed during the four panel discussions. United States General Accounting Office paperback
199859761Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1998. Wraps. Very good. No dust jacket. Cover has slight wear and soiling. 324 p. : ill. maps; 28 cm. Includes: Illustrations Maps. GAO/HEHS-98-32. This report examings how VA and community hospitals' care evolved during the 20th century including changes in supply and demand factors contributing to declining demand the extent of excess capacity and actions taken to increase efficiency and compete for patients. United States General Accounting Office paperback
199169291Washington DC: U.S. General Accounting Office 1991. Presumed first edition/first printing. Wraps. Good. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Mailing label residue on back cover. vi 168 p. 28 cm. Illustrations. Note on Sources. Index. "GAO/OP-3-HP"--Cover. This is one of the United States General Accounting Office History Program. From Wikipedia: "The Government Accountability Office GAO is an independent agency which provides to the United States Congress audit evaluation and investigative services. As such it is part of the legislative branch of the United States government. The GAO was established as the General Accounting Office by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The act required the head of the GAO to "investigate at the seat of government or elsewhere all matters relating to the receipt disbursement and application of public funds and shall make to the President.and to Congress.reports and recommendations looking to greater economy or efficiency in public expenditures". According to the GAO's current mission statement the agency exists to support the Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. The name was changed in 2004 by the GAO Human Capital Reform Act to better reflect the mission of the office. While most other countries have government entities similar to the GAO their focus is primarily on conducting financial audits. The GAO's auditors conduct not only financial audits but also engage in a wide assortment of performance audits." U.S. General Accounting Office paperback
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19862080502106908785Moriyama shoten 1986. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Moriyama shoten paperback
19862080502106909609Moriyama shoten 1986. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Moriyama shoten paperback
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19372080502106909765Moriyama shoten 1937. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Moriyama shoten paperback
19372080502106915020Moriyama shoten 1937. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Moriyama shoten paperback
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19522080502106914061Moriyama shoten 1952. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Moriyama shoten paperback
19502080502106914761Moriyama shoten 1950. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Moriyama shoten paperback
19362080502106915972Moriyama shoten 1936. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Moriyama shoten paperback
19382080502106914062Moriyama shoten 1938. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Moriyama shoten paperback
19352080502106915973Moriyama shoten 1935. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Moriyama shoten paperback
19392080502106915021Moriyama shoten 1939. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Moriyama shoten paperback
2081002109000360Moriyama shoten N.A. Soft Cover. Fine. Number of pages: 373p Plate size: 22cm Moriyama shoten paperback
19412080502106914060Moriyama shoten 1941. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Moriyama shoten paperback
1905319116Julius Mäser Leipzig-R. 1905. Hardcover Die Jahresangabe ist ungefähr. Zustand: Keine Beschädigungen mit einer Namenseintragung. Rücken Ecken Kanten gut. Aus einer Klosterbibliothek mit Kennungen Stempel Rückenschild. Julius Mäser, Leipzig-R., hardcover
19742080502106914071Tax Accounting Association 1974. Soft Cover. Fine. The book is in fine condition. Tax Accounting Association paperback
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