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US General Accounting Office U SBiblio.com

Peace operations cost of DOD operations in Somalia : report to congressional committees SuDoc GA 1.13:NSIAD-94-88 U.S. General Accounting Office

United States General Accounting OfficeBiblio.com

Information Technology Investment Management; A Framework for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity Exposure Draft GAO/AIMD-10.1.23

200077137Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 2000. Version 1 Exposure Draft. Wraps. Very good. iv 163 1 pages. Footnotes. Figures. Abbreviations. Appendices including a Glossary. Document Distribution Center Customer Service Survey form laid in. Few draft copies survive. This was a precursor to a 2004 Executive Guide of the same title published as GAO-04-394G. An exposure draft was typically used to broadly solicit comments from multiple agencies and stakeholders. Otherwise audit and review drafts were typically shared with the studied agency for factual accuracy and to obtain a management response. In 1997 the GAO developed guidance based primarily on the Clinger-Cohen Act that provides a method for evaluating and assessing how well a federal agency is selecting and managing its IT resources and identifies specific areas where improvements can be made. The Information Technology Investment Management framework identifies critical processes for successful IT investment and organizing these processes into a framework of increasingly mature stages. This shift reflects both the maturation of the thinking in the area of IT investment management and the feedback we received from organizations based upon their experiences creating their IT investment mechanisms and processes. Such a maturity framework can be used to analyze an organization's IT investment management process and determine the maturity of its investment process. In doing so ITIM establishes three key benefits: 1 a rigorous standardized tool for internal and external evaluations of an agency's IT investment management process; 2 a consistent and understandable mechanism for reporting the results of these assessments to agency executives the Congress and other interested parties; and 3 a road map agencies can use for improving their IT investment management process. The achievement of more mature IT investment management stages depends on performing other good management practices and attributes such as human capital training IT architecture and software management. United States General Accounting Office paperback

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United States General Accounting OfficeBiblio.com

National Missile Defense; Even With Increased Funding Technical and Schedule Risks Are High GAO/NSIAD-98-153

199891246Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1998. Presumed First Edition First Printing. Wraps. Very good. 23 1 pages. Footnotes. Illustrations. Tabular data. This is a "Report to Congressional Requesters". This report responds to a Congressional request that the GAO review the National Missile Defense NMD program funding requirements and schedule and technical risks. Specifically you asked us to determine 1 why the Department of Defense DOD significantly increased the program's near-term funding in its May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review 2 how funding increases authorized and appropriated by Congress for the program in fiscal years 1996 through 1998 have been used or are planned to be used and 3 DOD's planned level of future funding for the NMD program and planned uses for those funds. You also asked for an assessment of the program's current schedule and technical risks. We provided an initial assessment of the schedule and technical risks in our December 12 1997 report to you. This report updates that assessment. The primary mission of NMD is to defend the United States against an intercontinental ballistic missile attack consisting of several missiles launched from a rogue nation. It would also have some capability against an accidental launch from nuclear powers such as Russia or China. The United States has been developing technologies for use in an NMD system for a number of years. In April 1996 DOD changed the purpose of the NMD program from a technology readiness program to a deployment readiness program and designated NMD as a major defense acquisition program. Under the technology readiness program the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization BMDO developed and matured technologies for possible use in an NMD system. Under the current deployment readiness program BMDO plans to integrate the technologies into a system that can be made operational. The deployment readiness program is commonly known as the "33" program. The goal of the NMD 33 program is to develop and demonstrate by fiscal year 2000 an initial limited capability that could be deployed by fiscal year 2003. The deployment decision is to be based on ongoing assessments of the threat and will not be made until fiscal year 2000 at the earliest. If DOD concludes at that time that the threat does not warrant deployment by fiscal year 2003 development will continue. While BMDO is still determining the specific design of the initial NMD system its features will include 1 space- and ground-based sensors to provide early warning of attacking missiles; 2 ground-based radars to identify and track the threatening warheads; 3 ground-based interceptors to collide with and destroy incoming warheads; and 4 a battle management command control and communications system. United States General Accounting Office paperback

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United States General Accounting OfficeBiblio.com

Nuclear Weapons Complex: Issues Surrounding Consolidating Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories; Statement of Victor S. Rezendes Director Energy and Science Issues Resources Community and Economic Development Division: Testimony Before the Committee on Science Space and Technology House of Representatives GAO/T-RCED-92-98

199280751Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1992. Contemporary Xerox copies. Six individually stapled items held together by a binder clip. Good. 1 31 pages. Together with copies of the testimonies of John Deutch 10 pages Lewis Branscomb 11 pages William Brinkman 5 pages and Eric Bloch 14 pages. Also included at the Opening Remarks of Chairman George E. Brown Jr. 5 pages. Dr. Deutch testified in his capacity as an Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and referred to his holding several positions at the Department of Energy during the period 1978 to 1980. Professor Branscomb testified in his capacity as the Director Science Technology and Public Policy Program as the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Professor Branscomb had served as the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President and was thus the President's Science Advisor. William F. Brinkman testified as the Executive Director Research Physics Division of AT&T Bell Laboratories. William Frank Brinkman was an American physicist who served as president of the American Physical Society 2002 and was the head of the Office of Science at the United States Department of Energy 2009-2013. He was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 1984 and won the George E. Pake Prize in 1994. Erich Bloch was a Distinguished Fellow Council on Competitiveness. Erich Bloch 1925 - 2016 was an electrical engineer and administrator. He was involved with developing IBM's first transistorized supercomputer 7030 Stretch and mainframe computer System/360. He served as director of the National Science Foundation from 1984 to 1990. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: We are pleased to be here today to testify on the Department of Energy's DOE nuclear weapons laboratories. As you requested our testimony focuses on three areas: 1 the research development and testing RD&T capabilities of the Los Alamos and Livermore National Laboratories; 2 the recent trends in staffing and funding at DOE's weapons laboratories; and 3 options identified by the laboratories and DOE for consolidating the Los Alamos and Livermore RD&T programs. This<br/>testimony provides a baseline for future congressional deliberations on these issue. Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories maintain a deliberately redundant nuclear warhead research development and testing RD&T infrastructure. The redundancy<br/>between Los Alamos and Livermore was intended to stimulate competition in the nation's efforts to design nuclear warheads. With the end of the Cold War however the nature of the nuclear warhead RD&T effort at the laboratories has been changing rapidly. Changes in the world coupled with the possibility of substantial budget cuts in the nuclear weapons area brings into question whether the nation still needs or can financially sustain the laboratories' current level of redundancy. In summary although Los Alamos and Livermore have<br/>duplicative RD&T capabilities in general over the years their independent approaches have led to each developing specialized knowledge and capabilities. Over the past several years both RD&T funding and staffing have declined significantly at the laboratories. With this recent and anticipated continued decline in resources devoted to nuclear weapons RD&T some consolidation of the laboratories' functions has already occurred and more is in process. The laboratories believe the potential savings are small relative to the funds needed to maintain the entire nuclear weapons complex. The laboratories believe however that savings are possible by avoiding additional duplicative facilities in the future. Both laboratories strongly prefer the current two-laboratory structure for weapons design. However Los Alamos officials believe that if the nation is to maintain its nuclear competence in the event of further significant cuts in nuclear weapons RD&T the current structure may need to be radically altered. In addition they believe that any new configuration must maintain the current benefits of competition and peer review. United States General Accounting Office unknown

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United States General Accounting OfficeBiblio.com

Nuclear Winter: Uncertainties Surround the Long-Term Effects of Nuclear War; Report to the Congress GAO/NSIAD-86-62

198683634Washington DC: United States General Accounting Office 1986. Presumed First Edition First printing. Wraps. Good. 55 1 pages. Footnotes. Appendix I is Selected Literature Reviewed. This report examines scientific and policy implications of nuclear winter. It is based on extensive review of relevant literature and detailed discussions with a wide range of scientists researchers and policy analysts within and outside of government. It provides an overview of what is known about nuclear winter and of ongoing research addressing areas of scientific uncertainty. It also outlines potential implications for defense strategy arms control and foreign policy-making and points out the absence of a consensus on the need for policy changes at this time. The Office of Science and Technology Policy after reviewing the report in draft suggested that GAO by discussing potential policy implications was giving more validity to the nuclear winter theory that was warranted and suggested the tenor of the report be changed. GAO did not agree. Nuclear winter is a severe and prolonged global climatic cooling effect that is hypothesized to occur after widespread firestorms following a large-scale nuclear war. The hypothesis is based on the fact that such fires can inject soot into the stratosphere where it can block some direct sunlight from reaching the surface of the Earth. It is speculated that the resulting cooling would lead to widespread crop failure and famine. When developing computer models of nuclear-winter scenarios researchers use the conventional bombing of Hamburg and the Hiroshima firestorm in World War II as example cases where soot might have been injected into the stratosphere alongside modern observations of natural large-area wildfire-firestorms. "Nuclear winter" or as it was initially termed "nuclear twilight" began to be considered as a scientific concept in the 1980s after it became clear that an earlier hypothesis that fireball generated NOx emissions would devastate the ozone layer was losing credibility. It was within this context that the climatic effects of soot from fires became the new focus of the climatic effects of nuclear war. In these model scenarios various soot clouds containing uncertain quantities of soot were assumed to form over cities oil refineries and more rural missile silos. Once the quantity of soot is decided upon by the researchers the climate effects of these soot clouds are then modeled. The term "nuclear winter" was a neologism coined in 1983 by Richard P. Turco in reference to a one-dimensional computer model created to examine the "nuclear twilight" idea. This model projected that massive quantities of soot and smoke would remain aloft in the air for on the order of years causing a severe planet-wide drop in temperature. Turco would later distance himself from these extreme conclusions. After the failure of the predictions on the effects of the 1991 Kuwait oil fires that were made by the primary team of climatologists that advocate the hypothesis over a decade passed without any new published papers on the topic. United States General Accounting Office paperback

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United States General Accounting OfficeBiblio.com

Operation Desert Storm. Evaluation of the Air Campaign; GAO Report to the Ranking Minority Member Committee on Commerce House of Representatives GAO/NSIAD-97-134

199779427Washington DC: General Accounting Office National Security and International Division June 1997. Presumed First Edition First printing White cover not usual blue cover--reprint/. Wraps. Good. 235 pages. Oversized book measuring 11 inches by 8/1-2 inches. Postage sticker and part of a shipping label roughly removed on rear cover. This report is the unclassified version of a classified report that the General Accounting Office issued in July 1996 on the Operation Desert Storm air campaign. At the request of John D. Dingell the Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on Commerce House of Representatives the Department of Defense reevaluated the security classification of the original report and as a result about 85 percent of the material originally determined to be classified has subsequently been determined to be unclassified and is presented in this report. The best available data did not permit GAO to either: 1 make a comprehensive system-by-system quantitative comparison of aircraft and weapon effectiveness; or 2 validate some of the key performance claims for certain weapon systems. Pursuant to Congressional direction GAO reviewed the Operation Desert Storm air campaign focusing on the: 1 use and performance of aircraft munitions and missiles employed during the air campaign; 2 validity of Department of Defense DOD and manufacturer claims particularly those for weapon systems utilizing advanced technology; 3 relationship between cost and performance of weapon systems; and 4 extent that Desert Storm air campaign objectives were met. GAO noted that: 1 air power clearly achieved many of Desert Storm's objectives but fell short of fully achieving others; 2 the available quantitative and qualitative data indicate that air power damage to several major target sets was more limited than DOD's title V report to the Congress stated; 3 these data show clear success against the oil and electrical target categories but less success against Iraqi air defense command control and communications and lines of communication; 4 success against nuclear-related mobile Scud and Republican Guard targets was the least measurable; 5 the lessons that can be learned from Desert Storm are limited because of the unique conditions the strike tactics employed by the coalition the limited Iraqi response and limited data on weapon system effectiveness; 6 the strong likelihood of campaign success enabled U.S. commanders to favor strike tactics that maximized aircraft and pilot survivability rather than weapon system effectiveness; 7 the Iraqis employed few if any electronic countermeasures and presented almost no air-to-air opposition; 8 as a result Desert Storm did not consistently or rigorously test all the performance parameters of aircraft and weapon systems used in the air campaign; 9 many of DOD's and manufacturers' postwar claims about weapon system performance were overstated misleading inconsistent with the best available data or unverifiable; 10 aircraft and pilot losses were historically low partly owing to the use of medium- to high-altitude munition delivery tactics that nonetheless both reduced the accuracy of guided and unguided munitions and hindered target identification and acquisition; 11 air power was inhibited by the limited ability of aircraft sensors to identify and acquire targets the failure to gather intelligence on critical targets and the inability to collect and disseminate battle damage assessments BDA in a timely manner; 12 the contributions of guided weaponry incorporating advanced technologies and their delivery platforms were limited because the cooperative operating conditions they require were not consistently encountered; 13 the important contributions of stealth and laser-guided bombs were emphasized as was the need for more and better BDA and less attention was paid to the significant contributions of less-sophisticated systems and the performance of critical tasks such as the identification and acquisition of targets; and 14 there was no apparent link between the cost of aircraft and munitions and their performance in Desert Storm. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Division paperback

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United States Congress General Accounting OfficeBiblio.com

Operation Desert Storm: Investigation of a U.S. Army Fratricide Incident: Report to the Honorable Fred Thompson U.S. Senate: GAO/OSI-95-10

199567164Washington DC: United States Congress General Accounting Office 1995. Presumed First Edition/first printing. Wraps. Very good. Pencil ersasure residue on first page. 109 p. Includes illustrations. In the early morning of February 27 1991 during the Persian Gulf War Army Corporal Douglas Lance Fielder was unintentionally killed by U. S. soldiers who had mistaken him and his fellow engineers as the enemy. GAo was requested to determine the events that had led to the fratricide assess the adequacy of U.S. Army investigations following that fratricide and investigate allegations that Army officials hindered invistigations of the fratricide incident or influenced their outcome. From Wikipedia: "Fratricide from the Latin words frater "brother" and cida "killer " or cidum "a killing " both from caedere "to kill to cut down" is the act of a person killing his or her brother.Fratricide may also be used to refer to friendly fire incidents. It also refers to the possible destruction of one MIRV warhead by another. Targets may be arranged deliberately to increase the likelihood in a strategy called dense pack." Also from Wikipedia: "The Gulf War 2 August 1990 28 February 1991 codenamed Operation Desert Storm 17 January 1991 28 February 1991 was a war waged by a U.N. -authorized Coalition force from 34 nations led by the United States against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The war is also known under other names such as the Persian Gulf War First Gulf War Gulf War I or the First Iraq War before the term "Iraq War" became identified instead with the 2003 Iraq War also referred to in the U.S. as "Operation Iraqi Freedom". Kuwait's invasion by Iraqi troops that began 2 August 1990 was met with international condemnation and brought immediate economic sanctions against Iraq by members of the U.N. Security Council. U.S. President George H. W. Bush deployed U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia and urged other countries to send their own forces to the scene. An array of nations joined the Coalition. The great majority of the Coalition's military forces were from the U.S. with Saudi Arabia the United Kingdom and Egypt as leading contributors in that order. Saudi Arabia paid around US$36 billion of the US$60 billion cost. The war was marked by the beginning of live news on the front lines of the fight with the primacy of the U.S. network CNN. The war has also earned the nickname Video Game War after the daily broadcast images on board the U.S. bombers during Operation Desert Storm. The initial conflict to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial bombardment on 17 January 1991. This was followed by a ground assault on 24 February. This was a decisive victory for the Coalition forces who liberated Kuwait and advanced into Iraqi territory. The Coalition ceased their advance and declared a cease-fire 100 hours after the ground campaign started. Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq Kuwait and areas on Saudi Arabia's border. Iraq launched Scud missiles against Coalition military targets in Saudi Arabia and against Israel." United States, Congress, General Accounting Office paperback

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