335 résultats
198562509Washington DC: United States 1985. Presumed first edition/first printing. Wraps. Good. No dust jacket as issued. Paperclip mark on front and first page noted. Cover has some wear and soiling. 3 x 15 p. The appendices were in separate volumes at least two were classified and are not present. William Clark was the Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Task Group. This report was submitted in compliance with Section 1632 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act 1985 Public Law 98-525 and Executive Order 12499 of January 18 1985. The Task Group addressed procedures used by the Departments of Defense and Energy in establishing requirements and providing resources for the research development testing production surveillance and retirement of nuclear weapons. Members of the Task Group included James Schlesinger Former Secretary of Energy and Defense Former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Harold Agnew former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Jeane Kirkpatrick Former Ambassador to the United Nations and William Perry Former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. United States paperback
200865325Washington DC: United States Department of Defense 2008. Presumed first edition/first printing. Wraps. Very good. No dust jacket as issued. Includes illustrations. Various paginations 84 pages. Footnotes. Serious incidents in 2006 and 2007 alerted the Department of Defense to the Air Force's mishandling of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-related material. In June 2008 Secretary fo Defense Robert Gates appointed a Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management to recommend necessary improvements and measures to enhance deterrence and international confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This report was stated as being the first of two from the Task Force. United States, Department of Defense paperback
199668604Washington DC: United States Department of Defense 1996. Presumed first edition/first printing thus. Wraps. Very good. No dust jacket. Has slight wear and soiling. Tape bound. Various paginations approximately 125 pages. Figures. Acronyms. Chronology. The purpose of this Stockpile Management Information Handbook was to provide an overview of the Department of Defense DoD0 Acquisition Management System AMS; key organizations in that process; the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process between the DoD and the Department of Energy DOE; DOER organizations and production facilities; the documents used in the US nuclear weapons stockpile management process; and important events in the history of nuclear weapons. This handbook was intended to be both a training tool for persons without previous experience in the development acquisition and stockpile management of nuclear weapons as well as a reference book for persons on the job. This handbook was not intended to be a comprehensive reference source for program managers. United States Department of Defense paperback
199970684Washington DC: United States. Department of Defense 1999. First Edition stated. Presumed First Printing. Trade paperback. Very good. xviii 62 pages. Includes: Illustrations Diagrams. Acronyms and Abbreviations. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Nuclear weapons life extension and countering nuclear threats will continue to be a central concern for the United States and the Department of Defense. The Department has identified the dual missions of sustaining a safe secure and effective nuclear deterrent and countering the threat from nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation as among the most important for U.S. national security priorities. Nuclear Matters serves as the focal point for these missions within the Department of Defense. "To deter nuclear war and serve as last resort weapons of self-defense. In this sense U.S. nuclear weapons are fundamental to our nation's security and have historically provided a deterrent against aggression and security assurance to U.S. allies. A robust flexible and survivable U.S. nuclear arsenal underpins the U.S. ability to deploy conventional forces worldwide; provides the Commander-in-Chief with credible response options to strengthen deterrence; and supports U.S. nonproliferation goals by extending deterrence to allies thereby dissuading them from developing their own nuclear weapons." Secretary of Defense Mattis at his confirmation hearing January 2017 This was intended to be a basic reference on the nuclear hardening of military systems. This Guidebook was not intended to be a definitive document on the effects of nuclear weapons or a "how to" guide for Project Managers but rather it provides information to staff officers who require a basic understanding of nuclear hardening as it relates to the acquisition of nuclear survivable systems. The information is this Guidebook was current as of September 1999. Nuclear weapon system survivability is concerned with the ability of U.S. nuclear deterrent forces to survive against the entire threat spectrum that includes but is not limited to nuclear weapon effects. The vast range of potential threats include: · conventional and electronic weaponry; · nuclear biological and chemical weapons; · advanced technology weapons such as high-power microwaves and radio frequency weapons; · terrorism or sabotage; and · the initial effects of a nuclear detonation. Put simply nuclear weapon effects survivability refers to the ability of any and all personnel equipment and systems including but not limited to nuclear systems to survive nuclear weapon effects. Nuclear weapon system survivability refers to nuclear weapon systems being survivable against any threat including but not limited to the nuclear threat. Nuclear hardness describes the ability of a system to withstand the effects of a nuclear detonation and to avoid internal malfunction or performance degradation. Hardness measures the ability of a system's hardware to withstand physical effects such as overpressure peak velocities energy absorbed and electrical stress. This reduction in hardware vulnerability can be achieved through a variety of well-established design specifications or through the selection of well-built and well-engineered components. This appendix does not address residual nuclear weapon effects such as fallout nor does it discuss nuclear contamination survivability. United States. Department of Defense paperback
196159628Oak Ridge TN: Union Carbide Nuclear Company 1961. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Wraps. Good. No dust jacket. vi 80 pages. Highlighting/underlining. Name of previous owner present. Ink notation on front cover. Cover has some wear and soiling. Underlining noted at one line of text. Report Number KOA-888. Marked UNCLASSIFIED. Prepared for the Atomic Energy Commission under U. S. Government Contract W7405 eng 26. There are mathematical formulae and a large number of numerical values presented. There is only a limited amount of text. K-25 was the codename given by the Manhattan Project during World War II for the project to produce enriched uranium for atomic bombs using the gaseous diffusion method. Over time it came to refer to the production facility located at the Clinton Engineer Works in Oak Ridge Tennessee the main gaseous diffusion building and ultimately the site. When it was built in 1944 the four-story K-25 gaseous diffusion plant was the world's largest building with over 1640000 square feet of floor space and a volume of 97500000 cubic feet . The highly corrosive uranium hexafluoride UF6 was the only known compound of uranium sufficiently volatile to be used in this process. Slightly enriched product from the S-50 thermal diffusion plant was fed into the K-25 gaseous diffusion plant. The enriched uranium was used in the Little Boy atomic bomb used in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. In 1946 the K-25 gaseous diffusion plant became capable of producing highly enriched product. After the war four more gaseous diffusion plants were added to the site named K-27 K-29 K-31 and K-33. The K-25 site was renamed the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant in 1955. Production of enriched uranium ended in 1964. Union Carbide Nuclear Company paperback
B9781497307469Paperback / softback. New. paperback
B9781497312906Paperback / softback. New. paperback
B9781497312920Paperback / softback. New. paperback
1782662499.Gpaperback. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. paperback
B9781497307841Paperback / softback. New. paperback
197917254Washington:U. S. Nuclean Regulatory Commission 1979. soft cover. Very Good/No jacket. Washington:U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1979. Lacks continuous pagination though complete. Softcover. Covers show some light wear to the edges and spine but otherwise only gently soiled and in very good condition. Interior is clean bright and free of stray markings save for a few pages with some pencil underlining. Overall a very good copy. Washington:U. S. Nuclean Regulatory Commission paperback
3205512-nnew. unknown
3205512like new. unknown
ria9781410217073_inpPaperback. New. New Book; Fast Shipping from UK; Not signed; Not First Edition; CONTENTS: Preface Introduction -- Muriel Mitchell-Smith Regulations and Standards General and Biological Risks Radioluminous Materials Mining Agricultural and Construction Materials Containing Radioactivity Products Containing Radioac paperback
B9781410217073Paperback / softback. New. paperback
1410217078.Gpaperback. Good. Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items. May be an ex-library book. paperback
B9781497307681Paperback / softback. New. paperback
199977511Washington DC: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 1999. Presumed First Edition First printing. Wraps. Very good. Various paginations approximately 100 pages. Abbreviations. Appendix A: Tritium-Producing Burnable Absorber Rod TPBAR Tritium Production Core TPC Failure Modes and Effects Analysis VMEA Appendix B: Chronology of Correspondence. Appendix C: References. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Tritium-producing burnable absorber rods TPBARs used in the U.S. Department of Energy's Tritium Readiness Program are designed to produce tritium when placed in a Westinghouse or Framatome 17x17 fuel assembly and irradiated in a pressurized water reactor PWR. Under the terms of the Joint DOE/NRC Memorandum of Understanding of May 22 1996 NRC provided review and consultation services to assist DOE in assessing and resolving technical and licensing issues associated with the production of tritium in a commercial light-water reactor. The staff's review of the DOE topical report on the tritium production core and the staff's conclusions regarding the acceptability of irradiating up to approximately 3300 TPBARS in a core reload are documented in this safety evaluation. The staff identified a number of interface items that needed to be addressed by a licensee referencing the "Tritium Production Core Topical Report" in its plant-specific application for authorization to produced tritium for DOE. These are listed in Section 5 of this report. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation paperback
199777644Washington DC: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 1997. Presumed First Edition First printing. Wraps. Very good. Various paginations approximately 76 pages. Abbreviations. Appendix A-Chronology of Correspondence. Some cover wear. Under the terms of the Joint DOE/NRC Memorandum of Understanding of May 22 1996 NRC was providing consultation services to assist DOE in assessing and resolving technical and licensing issues associated with DOE's proposal for the production of tritium in a commercial light-water reactor. DOE had submitted a revised report containing sufficient information for the staff to determine whether the use of a CLWR to irradiate a limited number of tritium-producing burnable absorber rods in lead test assemblies LTAs raised issues involving an unreviewed safety question. The NRC reviewed the DOE report and prepared this safety analysis to address the acceptabiity of the proposed irradiation and whether a licensee could irradiate of these LTAs without NRC licensing action. As summarized in Section 10 of this safety evaluation the staff identified issued that required further NRC review. The staff also identified a number of areas in which an individual licensee undertaking irradiation of TPBAR LTAs would have to supplement the information in the DOE report before the staff could determine whether the proposed irradiation was acceptable at a particular facility. Therefore the staff concluded that a licensee undertaking irradiation of TPBAR LTAs in a CLWR would have to submit an application for amendment of its facility operating license before inserting the LTAs into the reactor. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation paperback
B9781497373235Paperback / softback. New. paperback
19410WS Singapure 1983. LEINEN 327 Seiten dies ist dies ist ein regulär ausgesondertes Bibliotheksexemplar aus einer wissenschaftlichen Bibliothek keine Markierungen/Anmerkungen das Buch ist sehr gut erhalten --- Lib. Ex. no marks LINEN 327 pages the book is in a very good condition WS Singapure 1983 unknown
198320326Singapore : World Scientific 1983. First Edition. Hardback. Fine cloth copy in an equally fine dw. Particularly and surprisingly well-preserved overall; tight bright clean and especially sharp-cornered. ; 327 pages; Physical desc. : vi 327 p. ; 22 cm. Subject: Isobars --Mesons --Nuclear Physics --Nuclei --Quarks Singapore : World Scientific hardcover
1980KOS01205753Asahi news shop 1980. Soft Cover. Fine. KOS01205753 Asahi news shop paperback
197773429Cambridge MA: Ballinger Publishing Company 1977. Presumed First Edition First printing. Trade paperback. Good. xvii 3 418 8 pages. Footnotes. Tables. Figures. Appendix. Glossary. Abbreviations and Acronyms. List of Study Group Members. Cover has some wear and soiling. Black marks on the three edges. This work was sponsored by the Ford Foundation. The project was administered by the MITRE Corporation. This work was reviewed in Foreign Affairs by Reviewed by Andrew J. Pierre. In part he assessed this work as an impressive book a commendable example of clarity depth and timeliness. He judged that this work appeared to have had considerable impact on the nuclear policy of the Carter Administration. The 21-member group of experts examined the whole range of issues surrounding nuclear energy. Its recommendations were: 1 the international and social risks associated with the reprocessing and recycle of plutonium far outweigh the economic benefits and there is no compelling reason for the U.S. to depend upon plutonium in this century; 2 the breeder reactor program should be deemphasized and the date for commercialization postponed beyond the year 2000; 3 nuclear waste management should be expanded and improved using stable geological formations; 4 U.S. uranium enrichment capacity should be enlarged so as to assure other countries adequate nuclear fuel supplies thereby reducing pressures to seek indigenous facilities that would provide a capability leading to weapons; and 5 the U.S. should through its nuclear export policy seek a consensus among supplier and consumer nations against the spread of national plutonium separation and uranium enrichment facilities. The reviewer considered this to be a landmark study. Among the Study Group Members were Spurgeon Keeney Harold Brown Albert Carnesale Abram Chayes Paul Doty Richard Garwin Joseph Nye Wolfgang Panofsky George Rathjens and Thomas Schelling. Ballinger Publishing Company paperback
