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National Nuclear Security AdministrationBiblio.com

Baseline Security Manual

200680756Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2006. Change 1. Spiral bound. Very good. 38 pages plus approximately 100 pages of attachments which have no dissemination restrictions. Stated as Official Use Only and that the permission of the Government Program Manager was required for reproduction and that distribution was restricted to Program personnel. Name of previous owner was taped to top right of cover page. It has become unattached but is present with this document. The Secretary of Energy has approved the establishment of GRIM RETORT hereafter referred to as the Program and the implementation of security measures above normal collateral and restricted data security requirements. The purpose of this Manual is to establish the baseline security requirements and procedures for all National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA Special Access Programs SAPs. Additional or supplementary security requirements for individual SAPs may be stipulated in specific documentation such as Program Plans Classification Guides Program Security Manuals Operations Security OPSEC Plans etc. Attachments includes information such as References Definitions SAP Indoctrination Agreement Annual Security Refresher Briefing OPSEC Plan Model and Self-Assessment Checklist. Special Access Programs SAPs in the U.S. Federal Government are security protocols that provide highly classified information with safeguards and access restrictions that exceed those for regular collateral classified information. SAPs can range from black projects to routine but especially-sensitive operations such as COMSEC maintenance or Presidential transportation support. In addition to collateral controls a SAP may impose more stringent investigative or adjudicative requirements specialized nondisclosure agreements special terminology or markings exclusion from standard contract investigations carve-outs and centralized billet systems. Within the Department of Defense SAP is better known as "SAR" by the mandatory Special Access Required SAR markings. Two types of SAP exist—acknowledged and unacknowledged. The existence of an acknowledged SAP may be publicly disclosed but the details of the program remain classified. An unacknowledged SAP or USAP is made known only to authorized persons including members of the appropriate committees of the United States Congress. Waived SAPs are a subset of unacknowledged SAPs in the Department of Defense. These SAPs are exempt by statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense from most reporting requirements and within the legislative branch the only persons who are required to be informed of said SAPs are the chairpersons and ranking committee members of the Senate Appropriations Committee Senate Armed Services Committee House Appropriations Committee and the House Armed Services Committee. Oftentimes this notification is only oral. A SAP can only be initiated modified and terminated within their department or agency; the Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Secretary of Energy Secretary of Homeland Security the Attorney General the Director of National Intelligence; their principal deputies e.g. the Deputy Secretary of State in DoS and the Deputy Secretary of Defense in DoD; or others designated in writing by the President. These offices are better known as 'classification authorities.' They retain the right to declassify or revise classification levels. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown

National Nuclear Security AdministrationBiblio.com

Departure Ceremony for Marty Schoenbauer May 28 2008

200882252Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2008. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. This is an approximately 8.5 inch by 11 inch sheet of stiff card paper folded at the center to create four 5.5 by 8.5 inch panels. Illustrations are on the front and back panels. Text is on all panels. Marty was born February 191953 in St. Louis Park Minnesota. He was a graduate of Montgomery High School in 1971 the U.S. Naval Academy in 1975 and the George Washington University in 1981. Marty was a U.S. Naval officer for 20 years and civil servant for 20 years with 8 of those years in the Senior Executive Service of the U.S. Department of Energy. He retired for the third time in April 2018 after 4 years at Honeywell. Marty honorably served his country in a number of Uniformed Service civilian and private sector career. This event program marked his departure from the Office of Defense Programs to take on a critically important Department of Energy position at the United States Embassy in Beijing People's Republic of China where he was the Secretary's Representative and Senior DOE representative in China. Copies of such event programs rarely survive the event itself. Presiding at the departure event was Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Robert L. Smolen and making the major presentation was Thomas P. D'Agostino Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. The senior representative of the United States Department of Energy at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing China is responsible for leading a team to advance U.S. security and economic interests in the areas of energy science and technology and nuclear security and nonproliferation. In this role the senior representative is responsible for developing analyses and recommendations for the Secretary on key strategic initiatives with China related to the overall energy relationship. The representative is responsible for conducting in-depth analyses for comprehensive energy policy planning and strategic decision making on international energy policy and investment and trade issues. The representative provides insights briefings and other comprehensive analyses on key energy issues in China and Asia more broadly including on the issues of energy security clean energy development and deployment energy efficiency clean energy technology innovation and bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives among others. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown

Ground Zero Books · États-Unis50,00 $US≈ 42,31 €

National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense ProgramsBiblio.com

FY 2016 Mid-Year Review Production Support & Management Technology and Production MTP; Feb 23rd -25th 2016

201679773Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2016. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Three Ring Binder. Good. Unpaginated with about 1.5 inches of material. This binder contains Tabs 1 through 7 on Management Technology and Production CNS Pantex CNS Y-12 NSC KC LANL LLNL SNL and SRS and Tabs 8 through 13 on Production Support CNS Pantex CNS Y-12 NSC KC LANL SNL and SRS Pencil notes on table of contents precedes Tab 1. Handwritten notes observed on several pages. Under MTP at Tab 4 LANL there is an additional sheet unpunched laid in entitled LANL FY 17 Budget Scenarios: Current Core & Transitional Scope. This work is a compilation of vuegraph presentations. While unmarked on the cover there is some material marked Official Use Only which it is understood not longer applies since that limitation was almost certainly due to the pre-decisional nature of then upcoming budget decisions. Such decisions were made a number of years ago such that there can be no fiscal or policy sensitivities remaining. Stockpile stewardship refers to the United States program of reliability testing and maintenance of its nuclear weapons without the use of nuclear testing. Because no new nuclear weapons have been developed by the United States since 1992 even its youngest weapons are at least 27 years old as of 2020. Aging weapons can fail or act unpredictably in a number of ways: the high explosives that condense their fissile material can chemically degrade their electronic components can suffer from decay their radioactive plutonium/uranium cores are potentially unreliable and the isotopes used by thermonuclear weapons may be chemically unstable as well. Since the United States has also not tested nuclear weapons since 1992 this leaves the task of its stockpile maintenance resting on the use of simulations using non-nuclear explosives tests and supercomputers among other methods and applications of scientific knowledge about physics and chemistry to the specific problems of weapons aging the latter method is what is meant when various agencies refer to their work as "science-based". It also involves the manufacture of additional plutonium "pits" to replace ones of unknown quality and finding other methods to increase the lifespan of existing warheads and maintain a confident nuclear deterrent. Most work for stockpile stewardship is undertaken at United States Department of Energy national laboratories mostly at Los Alamos National Laboratory Sandia National Laboratories Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory the Nevada Test Site and Department of Energy productions facilities which employ around 27500 personnel and cost billions of dollars per year to operate. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is a United States Department of Energy program to ensure that the nuclear capabilities of the United States are not eroded as nuclear weapons age. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown

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National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense ProgramsBiblio.com

FY11-FY17 Effective Surveillance Program Requirements and Workload Planning

201080985Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs 2010. Presumed first compilation--The number of copies made is unknown. Three Ring Binder. Good. Attendance list of 12-13 2011 Jan Surveillance Summit in front pocket--more than 30 names. List of 19 filled tabs 31 tabs present for 20-31 do not appear to have ever been filled. Tabbed items include: Effective Surveillance Program Memo dated 26 April 2010 then SNL LLNL and LANL responses then Requirements Workload Planning document of 22 Oct. 2010 followed by LLNL SRS KCP LANL PX SNL. Y12 NSO responses to the 22 Oct Memo followed by Summary of responses to 22 Oct Memo then followed by FYNSP responses from LLNL LANL and SNL followed by a Consolidated FYNSP responses. The 19th tab has the slides for workload meeting. Additional material in rear pocket: Surveillance Enterprise Governance 34 hard copy vugraphs 4 to a page--with some ink notations One page on NNSA Nuclear Weapons Surveillance Program 2 copies--one with notes on back One vugraph on FY 11 Surveillance Requirements and Over Targets with substantial notes Additional information on Consolidated Six Year Surveillance Requirements 12 sheets Greenaugh e-mail on Requirements workload 2 pages staples Illinger e-mail on Baselining New Surveillance Requirements 3 pages stapled Mangum e-mail on Surveillance Numbers 3 pages stapled 1 page on requires by site and funding program E-mail from Mangum on surveillance numbers 2 pages stapled with notes e-mail from Sinkular on NA 12 update 2 pages stapled with notes. Notes on November 5 2010 Goodrum Memo Teleconference and one page hardcopy vugraph on FY 11 Surveillance comparison. The use of data from surveillance of our nuclear weapons enables us to predict how the weapons will perform over time without nuclear explosive testing. This capability has improved significantly over the past decade and provides us with the capability to ensure an effective nuclear stockpile. Surveillance information is critical for the predictive models used in the annual nuclear weapon assessment process. These tools and the detailed quantitative modeling they support serve as key elements of the capability to maintain a safe secure and effective U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without underground nuclear explosive testing. The National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA annual assessment process has evolved significantly since the end of underground nuclear explosive testing to ensure an effective nuclear weapons stockpile. The current approach aims to achieve a comprehensive science-based understanding of nuclear weapon systems. Surveillance tools and models play critical roles in providing information essential to assessing weapon safety security and performance changes that would impact military effectiveness without performing underground nuclear explosive tests. These surveillance tools aid in the understanding of two conditions of weapons systems: the "as-built" and "as-aged" conditions. The "as-built" condition reflects the frequency and severity of original design or manufacturing defects. The "as-aged" condition reflects the evolution of age-related changes in materials components and subsystems that can alter performance. Over the last few years several advances in this area have contributed to a better understanding of the condition of our existing nuclear weapons and the ways in which the current condition could affect safety reliability or performance. Through the weapons surveillance program the U.S. has in-depth knowledge of the core components housed within weapons by using technologies such as nondestructive laser gas sampling and high-resolution computed tomography. System tests also assess the functionality of all major non-nuclear components. National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Programs unknown

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National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense ProgramsBiblio.com

High Explosives Integrated Strategy Team Files 11/12/2002; HE Team Closeout

200275230Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2002. Copy of Team Files. CD-R. Very good. This CD contains a treasure trove of information on High Explosive operations and facilities at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory the Los Alamos National Laboratory Sandia National Laboratories the Nevada Test Site and the Pantex Plant. This CD has the files that are excel spread sheets PDF files JPG files Power Point files and Word files. The material includes the scope team membership information from the sites information on sizing etc. This information was developed to address consolidation options between nuclear weapon laboratories and plants with an aim to reduce some costs. Major high explosive operations included research and development explosive testing detonator and small quantity production and 'main charge' production for nuclear weapons. Posted on-line--Los Alamos demonstrated the first use of plastic-bonded explosives in a nuclear explosion in 1956. This development allowed the shift from precision machined cast explosives to formulations containing high concentrations of high-energy density compounds with reduced sensitivity more uniformity and better mechanical characteristics. Since the 1960s Livermore has been researching and developing safer HE for Livermore-designed weapons. The plastic coating that binds the explosive granules typically 5 to 20% of each formulation by weight is what gives each PBX its distinctive characteristics. Pressing a PBX molding powder converts it into a solid mass with the polymer binder providing both mechanical rigidity and reduced sensitivity to accidental detonation. The choice of binder affects hardness safety and stability. The TATB-based formulations of Livermore's LX-17 and Los Alamos's PBX 9502 are "insensitive" high explosives IHE; others are termed "conventional." National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown

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National Nuclear Security AdministrationBiblio.com

High-Energy-Density Physics Study Report; A Comprehensive Study of the Role of High-Energy-Density Physics in the Stockpile Stewardship Program

2001809962001. Fourth Printing stated. Velobound. Very good. Various paginations approximately 180 pages. Illustrations color. Bibliography. Appendices A-K includes Glossary and Acronyms. Figures. Distribution memorandum laid in. In its fiscal year FY 2001 Energy and Water Development Appropriation Congress directed the National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA to complete a study that "includes conclusions as to whether the full-scale NIF National Ignition Facility is required in order to maintain the safety and reliability of the current nuclear weapons stockpile and whether alternatives to the NIF could achieve the objective of maintaining the safety and reliability of the current nuclear weapons stockpile." To meet this requirement the NNSA has conducted a detailed study of the role of high-energy-density physics HEDP and NIF in the Stockpile Stewardship Program SSP. The principal finding of this study is that a vital HEDP Program is an essential component of the SSP. Based on this finding the Office of Defense Programs DP recommends the continuation of the baseline HEDP Program including 192-beam NIF with the goal of achieving ignition. Section 3.4.6 addresses an aspect of nuclear weapons effects testing. Section 4.4 is entitled Weapons Effects. The SSP was established in response to the FY 1994 National Defense Authorization Act P.L. 103-160 Sect. 3138 which called on the Secretary of Energy to "establish a stewardship program to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons." In the absence of nuclear testing the SSP must: 1 support a focused multifaceted program to increase the understanding of the enduring stockpile; 2 predict detect and evaluate potential problems due to the aging of the stockpile; 3 refurbish and remanufacture weapons and components as required; and 4 maintain the science and engineering institutions needed to support the nation's nuclear deterrent now and in the future. The principal outcomes of the SSP are confidence in safety security and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons and a cadre of nuclear-skilled personnel underpinning nuclear deterrence. The NNSA national laboratories agree that a strong and diverse HEDP Program is an essential component of the SSP. An excellent understanding of high-energy-density physics is required to understand the operation of nuclear weapons. The fundamental requirements for the baseline HEDP Program are driven by meeting the needs of the stockpile and by a commitment to related broader national scientific interests. Based on these requirements the HEDP Program has developed a set of strategic goals in the following areas: weapons physics ignition high yield radiation effects basic science and supporting technologies. To determine if the HEDP Program is properly optimized to meet the needs of DP's mission DP invited senior members of the defense and scientific communities to examine high-energy-density activities conducted throughout the SSP. These study panel members were asked specifically to assess the role of high-energy-density physics within the SSP and to examine the facilities and program elements within the HEDP Program to assure that the goals of the SSP are met in the near and long term. Two areas that were not included directly in this study were HEDP activities within the Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign and the cost considerations associated with developing and operating the necessary experimental computational manufacturing and production capabilities required for the SSP. unknown

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National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Nuclear NonproliferationBiblio.com

Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention; Annual Report Fiscal Year 2001

200179902Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 2001. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Wraps. Very good. 19 13 pages. Mostly printed on both sides of a sheet. Sheets/project posters on several IPP projects are included at the back of this document. This year's report covers a year that involved a number of exciting developments in the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention IPP program. The program receives a significant vote of confidence for its commercialization focus with for successful IPP projects attracting $56 million in private venture capital funds. These funds were in addition to the already substantial contribution from U.S. industry partners who more than match U.S. government funding on each new IPP project. The IPP program also resumed operation in Kazakhstan and Ukraine adding the scientific talent of these countries to the technology resource base now available to U.S. industry partners. The program's nonproliferation objectives are met with increasing success as a growing number of former Soviet weapons scientists are engaged both in the course of ongoing work as well as in the jobs that are being created by successfully completed IPP projects. Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a central part of US national security policy. A principal instrument of the Department of Energy`s DOE`s program for securing weapons of mass destruction technology and expertise and removing incentives for scientists engineers and technicians in the newly independent states NIS of the former Soviet Union to go to rogue countries or assist terrorist groups is the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention IPP. IPP was initiated pursuant to the 1994 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. IPP is a nonproliferation program with a commercialization strategy. IPP seeks to enhance US national security and to achieve nonproliferation objectives by engaging scientists engineers and technicians from former NIS weapons institutes; redirecting their activities in cooperatively-developed commercially viable non-weapons related projects. These projects lead to commercial and economic benefits for both the NIS and the US IPP projects are funded in Russian Ukraine Kazakhstan and Belarus. This booklet offers an overview of the IPP program as well as a sampling of some of the projects which are currently underway. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation paperback

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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies, Office of Public AffairsBiblio.com

Joint Verification Experiment-25 Years Event Photographs

201376278Las Vegas: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies Office of Public Affairs 2013. Presumed First thus. DVD-RW. Very good. This contains dozens of photographs from the event in JPG format. There are multiple images in files titled: Day 1 Day 2 Day 2 Part 2 Dinner Dinner 2 Kearsarge GZ NSF Group Photo Steakhouse and U1a-Jasper. The United States part of the Joint Verification Experiment carried out in 1988 as the Kearsarge event in Operation Touchstone. Twenty-five years later before tensions increased between Russia and the United States a joint commemoration of the event was held at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site formerly the Nevada Test Site. This DVD contains photographs taken throughout the two day event. The objective of the JVE was to calibrate the seismic yield estimation capability of underground nuclear explosions conducted in both countries. It involved the unprecedented US on-site yield measurement of a Soviet nuclear explosion at its then nuclear test site in Kazakhstan and the reciprocal Soviet on-site yield measurement of a US nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Site. JVE provided the first opportunity for scientists from US and Soviet nuclear weapons laboratories to meet and work cooperatively. At the Nevada Test Site and at the follow-on experiment at the Soviet Semipalatinsk Test Site they developed confidence-building steps that made possible the ratification of the TTBT in 1990. Both Russians and Americans agree that cooperation between US and Soviet nuclear weapons scientists began with the JVE and the follow-on discussions on the TTBT verification mechanisms during the Geneva negotiations. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies, Office of Public Affairs unknown

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National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies, Office of Public AffairsBiblio.com

Joint Verification Experiment 25th Anniversary

201376279Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies Office of Public Affairs 2013. Presumed First thus. DVD-RW. Very good. This has two files. One of JVE historic photographs as a powerpoint presentation with about 160 images. The second file is a WMV format and is about a 40 minute video of Ambassador Paul Robinson's remarks shown at the commemoration. The United States part of the Joint Verification Experiment carried out in 1988 as the Kearsarge event in Operation Touchstone. Twenty-five years later before tensions increased between Russia and the United States a joint commemoration of the event was held at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site formerly the Nevada Test Site. The objective of the JVE was to calibrate the seismic yield estimation capability of underground nuclear explosions conducted in both countries. It involved the unprecedented US yield measurement of a Soviet nuclear explosion at its then nuclear test site in Kazakhstan and the reciprocal Soviet yield measurement of a US nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Site. JVE provided the first opportunity for scientists from US and Soviet nuclear weapons laboratories to meet and work cooperatively. At the Nevada Test Site and at the follow-on experiment at the Soviet Semipalatinsk Test Site they developed confidence-building steps that made possible the ratification of the TTBT in 1990. Both Russians and Americans agree that cooperation between US and Soviet nuclear weapons scientists began with the JVE and the follow-on discussions on the TTBT verification mechanisms during the Geneva negotiations. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies, Office of Public Affairs unknown

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National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense ProgramsBiblio.com

Management Technology & Production MTP and Production Support PS FY10 Program Review and FYNSP Planning Meeting November 17-18 2010; Enabling the Nuclear Security Enterprise to meet weapon production requirements

201080986Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs 2010. Presumed First Edition First printing --number of copies assembled is unknown. Three Ring Binder. Very good. The Table of Contents is: MTP 32 vugraphs 4 per page PS 59 vugraphs 4 per page KCP 20 vugraphs 1 per page PX 55 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page SRS 41 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page Y12 41 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page LANL 38 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page LLNL 48 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page SNL 158 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page Agenda 3 pages and Participant list 1 page. In the back pocket is a November 2010 Updated to the NDAA of FY 2010 Section 1251 Report and a stapled seven sheet compilation of Budget Requirements. Some material was marked Official Use Only but this limitation is understood to not longer apply due to the passage of time and public dissemination of comparable information. Approximately 2 inches of material in the binder. The Production Support Program is a DSW Program that funds multi-system manufacturing-based activities that provide individual site production capabilities and capacity for the LEPs LLC production weapon surveillance and weapon assembly and disassembly operations. The Production Support Program also enables the modernization of production capabilities to improve efficiency and ensure that manufacturing operations meet future requirements. This includes maintenance/calibration services for manufacturing operations to meet DoD War Reserve requirements. Collectively these activities directly support execution of systems engineering concepts and production integration. The Production Support Program provides DSW with the capability to conduct life extension work stockpile surveillance dismantlement work neutron generator production and detonator cable assembly production. The Management Technology and Production MTP Program's work scope is a multi-system production-based program that promotes nuclear security enterprise integration and enhances efficiency. MTP activities provide the products components and/or services for multi-weapon system surveillance laboratory/flight test data collection and analysis; weapons reliability reporting to DoD; DSW requirements tracking and execution; management and operation; and stockpile planning. The MTP Program funds plant and laboratory personnel to sustain the stockpile through activities related to surveillance; weapons response process improvements; engineering authorizations; safety assessments; use control technologies; containers; base spares; studies and assessments for nuclear operation safety; production of weapon components for use in multiple weapons systems; and transportation/handling gear for use in multiple weapons systems. The MTP Program also includes activities that benefit the nuclear security enterprise mission as differentiated from Production Support activities which support internal site-specific production missions. National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Programs unknown

Ground Zero Books · États-Unis250,00 $US≈ 211,52 €

National Nuclear Security AdministrationBiblio.com

NNSA Ignition Review Panel; National Ignition Campaign Review--June 2-3 2011 Volume 3

201180403Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2011. Presumed First thus. Held together with a binder clip. Very good. Volume 3 ONLY. C. Deeney's copy per cover sheet. While stated as Volume 3 this appears to be a stand-alone item documenting the Third Review Panel Meeting. It is labeled on the cover shee as NIC Preliminary Data. The agenda covers June 2 and June 3 2011. Among the topics and presentations at tabs are NIC Overview by E. Moses NIC Technical Framework by J. Lindl Ignition Tuning Experiments by N. Landen Progress on Target Layering by J. Atherton Implosion Experiments by J. Edwards and ITF/ITFX Assessment by J. Lindl and NIC FY11 Go-Forward Schedule by J. Atherton. The presentations are printed with four frames per page with substantial use of color. The National Ignition Facility NIF is a large laser-based inertial confinement fusion ICF research device located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore California. NIF uses lasers to heat and compress a small amount of hydrogen fuel with the goal of inducing nuclear fusion reactions. NIF's mission is to achieve fusion ignition with high energy gain and to support nuclear weapon maintenance and design by studying the behavior of matter under the conditions found within nuclear weapons. NIF is the largest and most energetic ICF device built to date and the largest laser in the world. The National Ignition Campaign NIC was a multi-institution effort established under the National Nuclear Security Administration of DOE in 2005 prior to the completion of the National Ignition Facility NIF in 2009. The scope of the NIC was the planning and preparation for and the execution of the first 3 yr of ignition experiments through the end of September 2012 as well as the development fielding qualification and integration of the wide range of capabilities required for ignition. Besides the operation and optimization of the use of NIF these capabilities included over 50 optical x-ray and nuclear diagnostic systems target fabrication facilities experimental platforms and a wide range of NIF facility infrastructure. The goal of ignition experiments on the NIF is to achieve for the first time ignition and thermonuclear burn in the laboratory via inertial confinement fusion and to develop a platform for ignition and high energy density applications on the NIF. The goal of the NIC was to develop and integrate all of the capabilities required for a precision ignition campaign and if possible to demonstrate ignition and gain by the end of FY12. The goal of achieving ignition can be divided into three main challenges. The first challenge is defining specifications for the target laser and diagnostics with the understanding that not all ignition physics is fully understood and not all material properties are known. The second challenge is designing experiments to systematically remove these uncertainties. The third challenge is translating these experimental results into metrics designed to determine how well the experimental implosions have performed relative to expectations and requirements and to advance those metrics toward the conditions required for ignition. At project completion in 2009 NIF lacked almost all the diagnostics and infrastructure required for ignition experiments. About half of the 3 yr period covered in this review was taken up by the effort required to install and performance qualify the equipment and experimental platforms needed for ignition experiments. Ignition on the NIF is a grand challenge undertaking and the results presented here represent a snapshot in time on the path toward that goal. The path forward presented at the end of this review summarizes plans for the Ignition Campaign on the NIF which were adopted at the end of 2012 as well as some of the key results obtained since the end of the NIC. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown

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National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense ProgramsBiblio.com

Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties; QMU Workshop August 9-10 2006 Washington DC

200680402Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2006. Presumed First thus. Three Ring Binder. Good. This binder has seven tabs five with information. After a table of contents the tabs are: Agenda Attendee Listing NA-11 Opening Comments Draft QMU Business Operating Procedure missing Definition of Terms QMU Site Differences missing and White Paper on "National Certification Methodology for the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile" . The White Paper is 8 pages with color illustrations. The Table of Contents has the name Deeny sic Deeney written in the upper right corner. This is believe to have been the copy of a Dr. Christopher Deeny then a senior executive in the office of Assistant Deputy Administrator for Research Development and Simulation NA-11. He later rose to the Assistant Deputy Administrator position. The agenda included assessments of QMU Methodologies at each lab a W76 Nuclear example a W80 example QMU differences between sites QMU Inconsistencies and a Path Forward discussion. There are 30 attendees listed from Sandia Los Alamos Livermore Argonne DOE Office of Science and NNSA. The NA-11 Opening Comments is a nine vugraph presentation that addressed workshop purpose goals description history external interest and desired outcome. The White Paper was authored by Bruce T. Goodwin then of Livermore and Raymond Juzaitis then of Los Alamos later head of the LLC that operated the Nevada National Security Site. This is a rare surviving snapshot of the U.S. Weapons Program development and assessment of Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties in the context of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program absent underground testing. Derived from Wikipeida: Quantification of Margins and Uncertainty QMU is a decision-support methodology for complex technical decisions. QMU focuses on the identification characterization and analysis of performance thresholds and their associated margins for engineering systems that are evaluated under conditions of uncertainty particularly when portions of those results are generated using computational modeling and simulation. QMU has traditionally been applied to complex systems where comprehensive experimental test data is not readily available and cannot be easily generated for either end-to-end system execution or for specific subsystems of interest. Examples of systems where QMU has been applied include nuclear weapons performance qualification and stockpile assessment. QMU focuses on characterizing in detail the various sources of uncertainty that exist in a model thus allowing the uncertainty in the system response output variables to be well quantified. These sources are frequently described in terms of probability distributions to account for the stochastic nature of complex engineering systems. The characterization of uncertainty supports comparisons of design margins for key system performance metrics to the uncertainty associated with their calculation by the model. QMU supports risk-informed decision-making processes where computational simulation results provide one of several inputs to the decision-making authority. There is currently no standardized methodology across the simulation community for conducting QMU; the term is applied to a variety of different modeling and simulation techniques that focus on rigorously quantifying model uncertainty in order to support comparison to design margins. The fundamental concepts of QMU were originally developed concurrently at several national laboratories supporting nuclear weapons programs in the late 1990s including Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory. The original focus of the methodology was to support nuclear stockpile decision-making an area where full experimental test data could no longer be generated for validation due to bans on nuclear weapons testing. The methodology has since been applied in other applications where safety or mission critical decisions for complex projects must be made using results based on modeling and simulation. Examples outside of the nuclear weapons field include applications at NASA for interplanetary spacecraft and rover development missile six-degree-of-freedom simulation results and characterization of material properties in terminal ballistic encounters. QMU focuses on quantification of the ratio of design margin to model output uncertainty. The process begins with the identification of the key performance thresholds for the system which can frequently be found in the systems requirements documents. These thresholds also referred to as performance gates can specify an upper bound of performance a lower bound of performance or both in the case where the metric must remain within the specified range. For each of these performance thresholds the associated performance margin must be identified. The margin represents the targeted range the system is being designed to operate in to safely avoid the upper and lower performance bounds. These margins account for aspects such as the design safety factor the system is being developed to as well as the confidence level in that safety factor. QMU focuses on determining the quantified uncertainty of the simulation results as they relate to the performance threshold margins. This total uncertainty includes all forms of uncertainty related to the computational model as well as the uncertainty in the threshold and margin values. The identification and characterization of these values allows the ratios of margin-to-uncertainty to be calculated for the system. These M/U values can serve as quantified inputs that can help authorities make risk-informed decisions regarding how to interpret and act upon results based on simulations. Verification and validation V & V of a model is closely interrelated with QMU. Verification is broadly acknowledged as the process of determining if a model was built correctly; validation activities focus on determining if the correct model was built. V&V against available experimental test data is an important aspect of accurately characterizing the overall uncertainty of the system response variables. V&V seeks to make maximum use of component and subsystem-level experimental test data to accurately characterize model input parameters and the physics-based models associated with particular sub-elements of the system. The use of QMU in the simulation process helps to ensure that the stochastic nature of the input variables as well as the underlying uncertainty in the model are properly accounted for when determining the simulation runs required to establish model credibility prior to accreditation. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown

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National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22)Biblio.com

Remote Sensing Program--Goals Objectives and Requirements; NA22-PDP-07-2008

200880995Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development NA-22 2008. Presumed First Edition First printing. Spiral bound. Very good. 27 1 pages including covers. Marked Official Use Only. This limitation is understood to no longer apply due to the passage of time and the public disclosure of comparable information in Congressional Budget Requests Congressional testimony and other information releases. The Atomic Energy Commission originally established the "Aerial Measurements Operations" at Nellis Air Force Base in Las Vegas Nevada in the 1950s. It was created to serve the worldwide emergency system by providing rapid response to radiological emergencies. In 1976 the DOE established an Aerial Measurements Operations at Andrews Air Force Base - now called Joint Base Andrews - in Maryland to provide scientific and technical support to counterterrorism efforts during U.S. Bicentennial events in Washington D.C. With a location on each coast the RSL has served for over 50 years as a valuable national asset for nuclear emergency response and remote sensing capabilities. The Remote Sensing Laboratory RSL is a center for creating and using advanced technologies that provide a broad range of scientific technological and operational disciplines with core competencies in emergency response operations and support remote sensing and applied science and technologies in support of counterterrorism and radiological incident response. The National Nuclear Security Administration's NNSA Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development NA-22 has undertaken a multi-year planning effort to focus its research and development R&D efforts on enabling technologies to improve U.S. capabilities to detect and monitor nuclear weapons production proliferation and testing worldwide. NA-22 has developed an expert Remote Sensing Program working group to assist in this planning. This document is the initial result of the planning effort and its purpose was to established the program's goals objectives and requirements. The primary intent of this document is to 1 provide guidance to the investigators at national laboratories other NA-22 program managers and the user community to better focus future Remote Sensing Program proposals 2 provide a vehicle for user community input and 3 serve as a starting point for the subsequent technology roadmapping process. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22) unknown

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National Nuclear Security AdministrationBiblio.com

Security for Special Programs

200575224Albuquerque NM: National Nuclear Security Administration 2005. Presumed First Edition First issuance thus. CD. Very good. On Hold Shelf. This disk has six files on it: 1. Welcome letter 2. Course Material 3. Self Review 4. Reference Material 5. Software and 6. Read Me. In the course material area there is information of special access programs security policies threat briefing OPSEC overview a Baseline Security Manual and practical exercises. The reference material is indicated as including Executive Orders Presidential Decision Documents Public Laws Director of Central Intelligence Directives 6 DCIDs DoD Manuals DOE policies and other associated materials. In opening the disk there was a reference to SNL so it is assumed that Sandia National Laboratories assisted at least in the production of the CD if not in the development of this training. This CD is marked 'Official Use Only" but previous experience in requesting a determination as to whether the dissemination limitation has almost without exception resulted in silence which we take after a period of time as indicating consent. Special access programs SAPs in the U.S. Federal Government are security protocols that provide highly classified information with safeguards and access restrictions that exceed those for regular classified information. SAPs can range from black projects to routine but especially-sensitive operations such as COMSEC maintenance or Presidential transportation support. In addition to routine controls a SAP may impose more stringent investigative or adjudicative requirements specialized nondisclosure agreements special terminology or markings exclusion from standard contract investigations carve-outs and centralized billet systems. There was no specific organization within the NNSA indicated on the CD that a question on dissemination could be referred to. Since this information is more than a decade old and because multiple requests for status on other Official Use Only materials have been ignored it is assumed that the OUO limitation no long applies. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown

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National Nuclear Security AdministrationBiblio.com

Synopsis of the Applied Technology Roadmap; Providing Defense Readiness for Tomorrow

200277513Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration c2002. Presumed First Edition First printing. Spiral bound. Very good. Format is approximately 11 inches by 8.5 inches. 30 pages plus covers. Maps. Footnotes. Illustrations many in color. Cover has slight wear and soiling. This document is a high-level synopsis of the full National Nuclear Security Administration's Applied Technology Roadmap. The larger document is the product of a collaborative effort by the NNSA and contractor representatives to the Applied Technology team. Representatives from all of the eight sites comprising the NWC as well as other NNSA staff from headquarters and several field offices participated in several workshops. The authors acknowledged a debt to the group that compiled the NNSA Applied Engineering Testing & Manufacturing Capabilities book. There were four pillars in the roadmap: Flexible Agile Manufacturing; Model-Based Design and Development; Responsive Integrated Enterprise; and Adaptable Knowledge-Enabled Workforce. The Nuclear Weapons Complex relies on the unique synergy created among the design laboratories and the production plants. The laboratories provide a strong science base while the production plants are capable of unmatched precision in producing a wide variety of materials components and assemblies. Together the laboratories and plants can transform a concept into specialized hardware to meet very demanding requirements. The complex thus created in a security environment for synthesizing and processing a wide variety of materials including hazardous and radioactive components. The Applied Technology Roadmap shows how the synergy of the NWC science and technologies base will be used to provide national defense for tomorrow. The most efficient way to support the nation is to build the 'pillars' formed from enabling technologies that rest upon the foundation of NWC capabilities capitalizing on existing and future investment in the NWC. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown

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National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense ProgramsBiblio.com

Test Readiness 9/22/03; Unclassified

200388243Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2003. Presumed a unique copy. Unknown if other copies were made. CD is in a paper envelope with a clear plastic face. Good. This disc is marked UNCLASSIFIED and there are no dissemination limitation markings on the three text files contained therein. These files are Implementation Plan FY 2004 Rev. 1 9 pages Management Plan Rev 9 pages and Program Plan Version 4 37 pages includes some strike-out passages. Underground tests conducted by the Soviet Union continued until 1990 the United Kingdom until 1991 the United States until 1992 and both China and France until 1996. In signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996 these countries pledged to discontinue all nuclear testing; the treaty has not yet entered into force because of its failure to be ratified by eight countries. Non-signatories India and Pakistan last tested nuclear weapons in 1998. North Korea conducted nuclear tests in 2006 2009 2013 2016 and 2017. The most recent confirmed nuclear test occurred in September 2017 in North Korea. The 2022 NPR says that the United States continues to observe a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. NNSA conducts subcritical i.e. those that do not produce a nuclear yield experiments and uses other tools to maintain stockpile reliability. The 2018 NPR stated that "the United States will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal." The 2022 NPR notes that the United States "maintains a nuclear explosive test readiness program in the event it is required to resolve technical uncertainties" but "does not envision or desire a return to nuclear testing." Underground nuclear testing is the test detonation of nuclear weapons that is performed underground. When the device being tested is buried at sufficient depth the nuclear explosion may be contained with no release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. <br /> The extreme heat and pressure of an underground nuclear explosion causes changes in the surrounding rock. The rock closest to the location of the test is vaporized forming a cavity. Farther away there are zones of crushed cracked and irreversibly strained rock. Following the explosion the rock above the cavity may collapse forming a rubble chimney. If this chimney reaches the surface a bowl-shaped subsidence crater may form. The first underground test took place in 1951. Further tests soon led scientists to conclude that even notwithstanding environmental and diplomatic considerations underground testing was of far greater scientific value than all other forms of testing. This understanding strongly influenced the governments of the first three nuclear powers to sign of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 which banned all nuclear tests except for those performed underground. From then until the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996 most nuclear tests were performed underground which prevented additional nuclear fallout from entering into the atmosphere. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown

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National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense ProgramsBiblio.com

Test Readiness 9/22/03; Unclassified

200388264Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2003. This may be a unique compilation. Survival status of content documents is unclear. CD in a paper envelope with clear plastic face. Very Good. This CD contains three files: Implementation Plan rev 1; Management Plan Rev. 3 and Program Plan Ver 4. These are draft documents and some pages show strike-outs. The first two are 9 pages each of which after the title and contents leave 7 pages of substance. The program plan is 37 pages and has graphics. From the Implementation Plan: The National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA is transitioning to a shorter test readiness posture. Since 1995 the NNSA has been required to maintain the capability to conduct an underground nuclear test within two to three years from receipt of the order. In FY2003 the NNSA began transitioning to an 18-month test readiness posture to be attained by September 30 2005. This Implementation Plan identifies the activities integration with other sites and programs and funding profile needed for the successful achievement of that objective. It defines associated risks to the schedule and scope of the program. More detail can be found in the Program Plan for Test Readiness. Funding is distributed from NNSA/Headquarters through the Nevada Site Office. The work is organized into five Major Technical Efforts MTEs each with its own MTE Manager. The MTE Manager is responsible for work integration across the participating organizations. The organizational Program Managers are responsible for accomplishing the work at their own organization. A more in-depth description of the management of this program can be found in the Management Plan for Test Readiness. From the Management Plan: The Test Readiness Program overall objective is to transition from the current 36-month to an 18-month nuclear test readiness posture by Sept. 30 2005. The Test Readiness Program is both cost and schedule constrained. Certain technical capabilities and knowledge foundations have not been exercised since the cessation of underground testing and must be re-established. The DOE/NNSA operating principles for the Test Readiness Program are to: Define an overall program governance structure; Solicit planning input from major participants NNSA Nevada Site Office NSO Los Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos or LANL Livermore National Laboratory Livermore or LLNL Sandia National Laboratories Sandia or SNL and Bechtel Nevada on overall strategy requirements technical objectives current as-is condition of test readiness and resource requirements to meet Presidential directive. Establish clear roles and responsibilities for the integrated program team; Ensure program/cross-project integration; Establish and manage to scope schedule and cost baselines; Focus on program and project execution success; and Control changes. Close coordination between NNSA Los Alamos Livermore Sandia and Bechtel Nevada is necessary to achieve the overall Test Readiness Program objective. The Test Readiness Management Team developed a specific Program Management Plan that provides an operational framework for the successful conduct of the program and its constituent projects. From the Program Plan: The program activities described within this document were identified in the Enhanced Test Readiness Cost Study DOE/NV-828 dated July 1 2002. That study confirmed the findings of other assessments and evaluations that found the longest-lead activities were updating the authorization basis producing replacement field test neutron generators and training technical staff on underground nuclear test-specific activities and diagnostics. The areas "Authorization Basis" and "Diagnostics & Training" comprise two of the five Major Technical Elements needed to achieve the enhanced test readiness posture. The others are: "Planning" "Facilities & Heavy Equipment" and "Operations". Building replacement field test neutron generators began in FY2002 and is funded under Operations. The highest risks for the program are associated with Authorization Basis and Diagnostics & Training. Authorization Basis requires resources that take a long time to train and are heavily used by other Stockpile Stewardship programs. Contracting out some of the work mitigates this. The personnel with underground nuclear test experience who will be needed for the success of Diagnostics & Training are retiring and otherwise becoming unavailable. Accomplishing those activities that require mentors before they leave will mitigate this. This program does not include Defense Threat Reduction Agency DTRA readiness interests beyond NNSA's traditional responsibilities to provide the nuclear source emplace detonate and diagnose the source device performance. Planning for DTRA source availability is addressed in the Major Technical Effort 1 Planning. The balance of NNSA responsibilities for Defense Threat Reduction Agency activities are common to NNSA underground testing and are maintained under NNSA test readiness. Finally it should be noted that this is a plan for test readiness not test execution. Test readiness addresses only those activities that are common to all tests but couldn't be conducted within the 18-month execution time frame. Support of activities to field a set of specific tests falls into the realm of test execution; and while test readiness resources would be used as needed the cost of test execution will require additional funds beyond the scope of test readiness. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown

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