Sciences occultes

Understanding and Managing Risk in Security Systems for the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex

2010 · 73685 — Washington DC: The National Academies Press 2010. Presumed First Edition First printing. Marked "Official Use Only" and "Limited Distribution". Wraps. Very good. xii 94 pages. Illustrations. Boxed text. Footnotes. References. Acronyms. Dissenting statement by W. Earl Boebert. Roger Hagengruber was a Committee member. Stiff card cover in cloth spine. Ink notation on front. An abbreviated version of about 30 pages was published in 2011. The mission of the National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine is to improve government decision making and public policy increase public understanding and promote the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge in matters involving science engineering technology and health. Our reports and other scientific activities inform policies and actions that can improve the lives of people in the U.S. and around the world. Our major programs conduct studies facilitate workshops and undertake other activities: Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; Earth and Life Studies; Engineering and Physical Sciences; Health and Medicine; Policy and Global Affairs; Transportation Research Board; and the Gulf Research Program. The Council's rules and regulations govern this work. It is understood that the distribution limitation has expired with the passage of time and publication of the abbreviated version. A nuclear weapon or a significant quantity of special nuclear material SNM would be of great value to a terrorist or other adversary. It might have particular value if acquired from a U.S. facility-in addition to acquiring a highly destructive tool the adversary would demonstrate an inability of the United States to protect its nuclear assets. The United States expends considerable resources toward maintaining effective security at facilities that house its nuclear assets. However particularly in a budget-constrained environment it is essential that these assets are also secured efficiently meaning at reasonable cost and imposing minimal burdens on the primary missions of the organizations that operate U.S. nuclear facilities. It is in this context that the U.S. Congress directed the National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA-a semi-autonomous agency in the U.S. Department of Energy DOE responsible for securing nuclear weapons and significant quantities of SNM-to ask the National Academies for advice on augmenting its security approach particularly on the applicability of quantitative and other risk-based approaches for securing its facilities. In carrying out its charge the committee has focused on what actions NNSA could take to make its security approach more effective and efficient. The committee concluded that the solution to balancing cost security and operations at facilities in the nuclear weapons complex is not to assess security risks more quantitatively or more precisely. This is primarily because there is no comprehensive analytical basis for defining the attack strategies that a malicious creative and deliberate adversary might employ or the probabilities associated with them. However using structured thinking processes and techniques to characterize security risk could improve NNSA's understanding of security vulnerabilities and guide more effective resource allocation. Over the course of the study the committee identified three key shortcomings in NNSA's current security approach: 1 the interactions and dependencies among security countermeasures; 2 the interactions between DOE/NNSA and other organizations responsible in part for preparing for or responding to an attack on NNSA facilities; and 3 the adequacy of attack scenarios used to design update and test the security systems to consider all possible attack scenarios. As a first step in addressing these shortcomings the committee recommends that NNSA adopt what the committee termed a "total systems approach" to characterize the interactions and dependencies of security countermeasures at its facilities. Such an approach is commonly used as an initial step in assessing the risks associated with a complex technological system. However performing such an analysis is not sufficient for implementing highly effective security. Coordination communication and joint exercises that include all relevant security organizations are also necessary. In addition it is essential to understand the adversary. This involves understanding adversary objectives goals and in particular how adversaries view the security system. The committee's approach could help DOE to better understand a range of potentially unexpected vulnerabilities and attack scenarios. The National Academies Press paperback