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20182111902160200078Shin Nihon hoki 2018. Soft Cover. Fine. Number of pages: 1725 pages Size: 18.5cmx13cm 1725p Number of books: 1 Shin Nihon hoki paperback
20192-1076302866Independently published 2019. Paperback. New. 303 pages. 11.00x8.50x0.76 inches. Independently published paperback
200485216Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration c2004. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. DVD. Very Good/In plastic case. Face of the CD/DVD states: To open double cline the "My Computer" icon on the desktop double click Drive D: double click ;nnsa catalog". There are images of weapons and platforms and technology images. Additional text reads The Nation's Applied Technology Complex. National Security Solutions Provider. Many customers many capabilities one enterprise. The National Nuclear Security Administration issued this catalogue in 2003-2004 and an updated version in 2005 to present information that its Nuclear Security Enterprise provided complete integration of design development application testing and production and that it provided customers of the Nuclear Weapons Complex with access to unsurpassed expertise. Customers were assured that they would receive more than the highest quality product; they were assured of security and safety throughout the entire process--from design to manufacturing to final delivery. NNSA asserted that it was this complete suite of design manufacturing and testing technologies that made it unique. At the time it was encouraging DOD Intelligence Community agencies and others with appropriate requirements to explore working with the NNSA and its management and operating contractors. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
200280753Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2002. Contemporary Xerox-style copy. Staplebound. Good. 4 18 18 pages of Risk & Opportunity Assessment 19-21 pages Fold-outs. This 90=day study was commissioned at the request of NA-12 senior management with the express purpose of finding weaknesses in the current ADAPT Campaign-level management and administrative processes and developing fixes alternatives and/or instituting new processes. The study was facilitated by experts from Westinghouse Savannah River Corp. and used their approach to systems engineering. The core members of the analysis team consisted of the seven ADAPT site manages and three MTE Major Technical Effort managers. The team was lead by the NA-12 Campaign Manager in collaboration with the NA-11 and NA-12 HQ ADAPT leads. The team developed a new vision for ADAPT with the future of the Nuclear Weapons Complex NWC in mind. Supporting the vision was a set of eleven goals that were intended to support a balance between short-term vs. long-term development needs efficient processes and procedures vs. effective stewardship and optimization of limited funds site-unique capability improvement vs. increased multi-site cooperation and collaboration; and improved communication of priorities problems expectations and requirements both from and to designers weapons program managers other campaigns and senior management. One of NNSA's core missions is to ensure the United States maintains a safe secure and reliable nuclear stockpile through the application of unparalleled science technology engineering and manufacturing. The Office of Defense Programs carries out NNSA's mission to maintain and modernize the nuclear stockpile through the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The Stockpile Stewardship Program enables NNSA to extend the lifespan and ensure the continued safety reliability and effectiveness of weapons that have reached the end of their original design life through life extension programs. These life extensions address aging and performance issues enhance safety features and improve security.<br/><br/>As with any complex mechanical system components in nuclear weapons degrade over time even when kept in storage. A life extension program comprehensively analyzes all of a weapon's components and determines whether to reuse refurbish or replace them to extend the service life of the weapon. When planning life extension programs NNSA must develop specific solutions to extend the lifetime of each weapon type because each is unique. Life extension programs also require NNSA to certify the weapon's protected period its new lifetime for 20 to 30 years. By extending the time that a weapon can safely and reliably remain in the stockpile NNSA is able to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent without producing new weapons or conducting underground nuclear explosive tests.<br/><br/>NNSA also conducts alterations of weapons at the system sub-system or component level to make sure the weapons is safe secure and effective. An alteration is a limited scope change that affects assembly tests maintenance and/or storage of weapons. An alteration may address identified defects and component obsolescence however it does not change a weapon's operational capabilities. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
200579903Albuquerque NM: Sandia National Laboratories 2005. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Wraps. Very good. 2 ii 32 4 pages. Footnotes. Illustrations color. Appendices A-E includes Glossary Visuals. Tables. ASC Timeline. Cover has minor wear and soiling. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program ASC is a cornerstone of the Stockpile Stewardship Program providing simulation capabilities and computational resources to support the annual stockpile assessment and certification to study advanced nuclear-weapons design and manufacturing processes to analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging and to provide the tools to enable Stockpile Life Extension Programs SLEPs and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations SFIs. This requires a balanced resource including technical staff hardware simulation software and computer science solutions. This Program Plan describes the ASC strategy and the deliverables required to accomplish the FY 2006-2010 multifaceted objectives defines program goals introduces the new national work breakdown structure and details the new subprograms their strategics and their associated performance indicators. The plan also includes ASC Level 1 Milestones and the top ten risks. To ensure synchronizations with the SSP's needs the Program Plan will be reviewed and updated annually. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program or ASC is a super-computing program run by the National Nuclear Security Administration in order to simulate test and maintain the United States nuclear stockpile. The program was created in 1995 in order to support the Stockpile Stewardship Program or SSP. The goal of the initiative is to extend the lifetime of the current aging stockpile. After the United States' 1992 moratorium on live nuclear testing the Stockpile Stewardship Program was created in order to find a way to test and maintain the nuclear stockpile. In response the National Nuclear Security Administration began to simulate the nuclear warheads using supercomputers. As the stockpile ages the simulations have become more complex and the maintenance of the stockpile requires more computing power. Over the years due to Moore's Law the ASC program has created several different supercomputers with increasing power in order to compute the simulations and mathematics. Within the ASC program there are six subdivisions each having their own role in the extension of the life of the stockpile. Facility Operations and User Support: The Facility Operations and User Support subdivision is responsible for the physical computers and facilities and the computing network within ASC. They are responsible for making sure the tri-lab network computing storage space power usage and the customer computing resources are all in line. Computational Systems and Software Environment: The Computational and User Support subdivision is responsible for maintaining and creating the supercomputer software according to NNSA's standards. They also deal with the data networking and software tools. The ASCI Path Forward project substantially funded the initial development of the Lustre parallel file system from 2001 to 2004. Verification and Validation: The Verification and Validation subdivision is responsible for mathematically verifying the simulations and outcomes. They help software engineers write more precise codes in order to decrease the margin of error when the computations are run. Physics and Engineering Models: The Physics and Engineering Models subdivision is responsible for deciphering the mathematical and physical analysis of nuclear weapons. They integrate physics models into the codes in order to gain a more accurate simulation. They deal with the way that the nuclear weapon will act under certain conditions based on physics. They also study nuclear properties vibrations high explosives advanced hydrodynamics material strength and damage thermal and fluid response and radiation and electrical responses. Integrated Codes: The Integrated Codes subdivision is responsible for the mathematical codes that are produced by the supercomputers. They use these mathematical codes and present them in a way that is understandable to humans. These codes are then used by the National Nuclear Society Administration the Stockpile Steward Program Life Extension Program and Significant Finding Investigation in order to decide the next steps that need to be taken in order to secure and lengthen the life of the nuclear stockpile. Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation: The Advanced Technology Development and Mitigation subdivision is responsible for researching developments in high performance computing. Once information is found on the next generation of high performance computing they decide what software and hardware needs to be adapted in order to prepare for the next generation of computers. Sandia National Laboratories paperback
200275970Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2002. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. DVD. Very good. The National Nuclear Security Administration's NNSA nuclear weapons complex NWC has identified developed and deployed successful high-value technologies in support of national security. The production plants testing facilities and national laboratories are a reservoir of technological capabilities unmatched in depth or breadth by any other institution. Cooperation between facilities involves interdisciplinary cross-facility knowledge exchanges at all levels of design and development to build perfectibility into the product. For example the Interplant Technology Team IPTT facilitates technical integration between NWC sites. This team promotes inter-site cooperation by helping to coordinate and focus resources that provide technology solutions. Reporting directly to the IPTT the Network of Senior Scientists and Engineers NSSE comprised of five scientists and engineers from each site meet quarterly to acknowledge and reward scientific excellence and to promote technical cooperation. The NWC is the steward of the Nation's defense nuclear mission-the military application of nuclear energy and the reducing of global danger from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The ability to address the threat of nuclear biological and chemical attacks and to protect high-value assets has assumed a higher priority. To that end the NNSA focus is on products and technologies that are immediately deployable. We can provide the crucial advantage needed to meet the terrorist threat in all conceivable forms and advance our national knowledge base to maintain the technological edge. This catalog of capabilities highlights those proven field-tested applications for deterrence and for rapid-response. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
201174113Amarillo TX: National Nuclear Security Administration Pantex Plant c2011. Presumed First thus. Patches. Very good. The patch is about 3.5 inches by 3.5 inches but the top is rounded so it is more like an arched window than a full square. It has a black border. The center has the image of the bomb a big dog and the text "B53" and "Last of the Big Dogs. On an orange border in black letters is "NNSA SS-21 Dismantlement DOE Pantex LANL LLNL SNL Y12 OST" From Wikipedia: The Mk/B53 was a high-yield bunker buster thermonuclear weapon developed by the United States during the Cold War. Deployed on Strategic Air Command bombers the B53 with a yield of 9 megatons was the most powerful weapon in the U.S. nuclear arsenal after the last B41 nuclear bombs were retired in 1976. The B53 was the basis of the W-53 warhead carried by the Titan II Missile which was decommissioned in 1987. Fifty B53s were retained during that time as part of the "hedge" portion of the Enduring Stockpile. The last B53 was disassembled on 25 October 2011 a year ahead of schedule. Development of the weapon began in 1955 by Los Alamos National Laboratory based on the earlier Mk 21 and Mk 46 weapons. In March 1958 the Strategic Air Command issued a request for a new Class C bomb to replace the earlier Mk 41. A revised version of the Mk 46 became the TX-53 in 1959. The Mk 53 entered production in 1962 and was built through June 1965. It entered service aboard B-47 Stratojet B-52G Stratofortress and B-58 Hustler bomber aircraft in the mid-1960s. From 1968 it was redesignated B53. Some early versions of the bomb were dismantled beginning in 1967. The B53 was also intended to be retired in the 1980s but 50 units remained in the active stockpile until the deployment of the B61-11 in 1997. At that point the obsolete B53s were slated for immediate disassembly; however the process of disassembling the units was greatly hampered by safety concerns as well as a lack of resources. In 2010 authorization was given to disassemble the 50 bombs at the Pantex plant in Texas. The process of dismantling the last remaining B53 bomb in the stockpile was completed in 2011. It was intended as a bunker buster weapon using a surface blast after laydown deployment to transmit a shock wave through the earth to collapse its target. Attacks against the Soviet deep underground leadership shelters in the Chekhov/Sharapovo area south of Moscow envisaged multiple B53/W53 exploding at ground level. It has since been supplanted in such roles by the earth-penetrating B61 Mod 11 a bomb that penetrates the surface to deliver much more of its explosive energy into the ground and therefore needs a much smaller yield to produce the same effects. The B53 was intended to be retired in the 1980s but 50 units remained in the active stockpile until the deployment of the B61-11 in 1997. At that point the obsolete B53s were slated for immediate disassembly; however the process of disassembling the units was greatly hampered by safety concerns and a lack of resources. The last remaining B53 bomb began the disassembly processes on Tuesday 25 October 2011 at the Energy Department's Pantex Plant. National Nuclear Security Administration, Pantex Plant unknown
200680756Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2006. Change 1. Spiral bound. Very good. 38 pages plus approximately 100 pages of attachments which have no dissemination restrictions. Stated as Official Use Only and that the permission of the Government Program Manager was required for reproduction and that distribution was restricted to Program personnel. Name of previous owner was taped to top right of cover page. It has become unattached but is present with this document. The Secretary of Energy has approved the establishment of GRIM RETORT hereafter referred to as the Program and the implementation of security measures above normal collateral and restricted data security requirements. The purpose of this Manual is to establish the baseline security requirements and procedures for all National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA Special Access Programs SAPs. Additional or supplementary security requirements for individual SAPs may be stipulated in specific documentation such as Program Plans Classification Guides Program Security Manuals Operations Security OPSEC Plans etc. Attachments includes information such as References Definitions SAP Indoctrination Agreement Annual Security Refresher Briefing OPSEC Plan Model and Self-Assessment Checklist. Special Access Programs SAPs in the U.S. Federal Government are security protocols that provide highly classified information with safeguards and access restrictions that exceed those for regular collateral classified information. SAPs can range from black projects to routine but especially-sensitive operations such as COMSEC maintenance or Presidential transportation support. In addition to collateral controls a SAP may impose more stringent investigative or adjudicative requirements specialized nondisclosure agreements special terminology or markings exclusion from standard contract investigations carve-outs and centralized billet systems. Within the Department of Defense SAP is better known as "SAR" by the mandatory Special Access Required SAR markings. Two types of SAP exist—acknowledged and unacknowledged. The existence of an acknowledged SAP may be publicly disclosed but the details of the program remain classified. An unacknowledged SAP or USAP is made known only to authorized persons including members of the appropriate committees of the United States Congress. Waived SAPs are a subset of unacknowledged SAPs in the Department of Defense. These SAPs are exempt by statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense from most reporting requirements and within the legislative branch the only persons who are required to be informed of said SAPs are the chairpersons and ranking committee members of the Senate Appropriations Committee Senate Armed Services Committee House Appropriations Committee and the House Armed Services Committee. Oftentimes this notification is only oral. A SAP can only be initiated modified and terminated within their department or agency; the Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Secretary of Energy Secretary of Homeland Security the Attorney General the Director of National Intelligence; their principal deputies e.g. the Deputy Secretary of State in DoS and the Deputy Secretary of Defense in DoD; or others designated in writing by the President. These offices are better known as 'classification authorities.' They retain the right to declassify or revise classification levels. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
201875706Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2018. Presumed First Edition First minting thus. Coin/Medal. As new. Approximately 2.25 inches in diameter. Front side has a black band at the outer edge with Mutual Defense Agreement at the top 60 years of partnership and Security at the bottom and the center image has the flags of both nations large number 60 and smaller dates 1958 and 2018. The back side has the same black band and text and the center has the following text: Here we are together defending all that to free man is dear. Prime Minister Winston Churchill Addressing the U.S. Congress December 24 1941. The 1958 US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement or UK-US Mutual Defence Agreement is a bilateral treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom on nuclear weapons cooperation. The treaty's full name is Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. It allows the United States and the UK to exchange nuclear materials technology and information. While the US has nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries including France and some NATO countries this agreement is by far the most comprehensive. Harold Macmillan called it "the Great Prize" National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
200882252Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2008. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Single sheet printed on both sides. Very good. This is an approximately 8.5 inch by 11 inch sheet of stiff card paper folded at the center to create four 5.5 by 8.5 inch panels. Illustrations are on the front and back panels. Text is on all panels. Marty was born February 191953 in St. Louis Park Minnesota. He was a graduate of Montgomery High School in 1971 the U.S. Naval Academy in 1975 and the George Washington University in 1981. Marty was a U.S. Naval officer for 20 years and civil servant for 20 years with 8 of those years in the Senior Executive Service of the U.S. Department of Energy. He retired for the third time in April 2018 after 4 years at Honeywell. Marty honorably served his country in a number of Uniformed Service civilian and private sector career. This event program marked his departure from the Office of Defense Programs to take on a critically important Department of Energy position at the United States Embassy in Beijing People's Republic of China where he was the Secretary's Representative and Senior DOE representative in China. Copies of such event programs rarely survive the event itself. Presiding at the departure event was Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Robert L. Smolen and making the major presentation was Thomas P. D'Agostino Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. The senior representative of the United States Department of Energy at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing China is responsible for leading a team to advance U.S. security and economic interests in the areas of energy science and technology and nuclear security and nonproliferation. In this role the senior representative is responsible for developing analyses and recommendations for the Secretary on key strategic initiatives with China related to the overall energy relationship. The representative is responsible for conducting in-depth analyses for comprehensive energy policy planning and strategic decision making on international energy policy and investment and trade issues. The representative provides insights briefings and other comprehensive analyses on key energy issues in China and Asia more broadly including on the issues of energy security clean energy development and deployment energy efficiency clean energy technology innovation and bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives among others. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
2011HVD-71111-OS-0Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration. Very Good. 2011. Paperback. 104 pages; CD is included! Very Good condition. No noteworthy defects. No markings. ; - Your satisfaction is our priority. We offer free returns and respond promptly to all inquiries. Your item will be carefully cushioned in bubble wrap and securely boxed. All orders ship on the same or next business day. Buy with confidence. . National Nuclear Security Administration paperback
2013HVD-71105-OS-0Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration. Very Good. 2013. Paperback. 104 pages; CD is included! Very Good condition. No noteworthy defects. No markings. ; - Your satisfaction is our priority. We offer free returns and respond promptly to all inquiries. Your item will be carefully cushioned in bubble wrap and securely boxed. All orders ship on the same or next business day. Buy with confidence. . National Nuclear Security Administration paperback
201679773Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2016. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Three Ring Binder. Good. Unpaginated with about 1.5 inches of material. This binder contains Tabs 1 through 7 on Management Technology and Production CNS Pantex CNS Y-12 NSC KC LANL LLNL SNL and SRS and Tabs 8 through 13 on Production Support CNS Pantex CNS Y-12 NSC KC LANL SNL and SRS Pencil notes on table of contents precedes Tab 1. Handwritten notes observed on several pages. Under MTP at Tab 4 LANL there is an additional sheet unpunched laid in entitled LANL FY 17 Budget Scenarios: Current Core & Transitional Scope. This work is a compilation of vuegraph presentations. While unmarked on the cover there is some material marked Official Use Only which it is understood not longer applies since that limitation was almost certainly due to the pre-decisional nature of then upcoming budget decisions. Such decisions were made a number of years ago such that there can be no fiscal or policy sensitivities remaining. Stockpile stewardship refers to the United States program of reliability testing and maintenance of its nuclear weapons without the use of nuclear testing. Because no new nuclear weapons have been developed by the United States since 1992 even its youngest weapons are at least 27 years old as of 2020. Aging weapons can fail or act unpredictably in a number of ways: the high explosives that condense their fissile material can chemically degrade their electronic components can suffer from decay their radioactive plutonium/uranium cores are potentially unreliable and the isotopes used by thermonuclear weapons may be chemically unstable as well. Since the United States has also not tested nuclear weapons since 1992 this leaves the task of its stockpile maintenance resting on the use of simulations using non-nuclear explosives tests and supercomputers among other methods and applications of scientific knowledge about physics and chemistry to the specific problems of weapons aging the latter method is what is meant when various agencies refer to their work as "science-based". It also involves the manufacture of additional plutonium "pits" to replace ones of unknown quality and finding other methods to increase the lifespan of existing warheads and maintain a confident nuclear deterrent. Most work for stockpile stewardship is undertaken at United States Department of Energy national laboratories mostly at Los Alamos National Laboratory Sandia National Laboratories Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory the Nevada Test Site and Department of Energy productions facilities which employ around 27500 personnel and cost billions of dollars per year to operate. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is a United States Department of Energy program to ensure that the nuclear capabilities of the United States are not eroded as nuclear weapons age. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown
201080985Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs 2010. Presumed first compilation--The number of copies made is unknown. Three Ring Binder. Good. Attendance list of 12-13 2011 Jan Surveillance Summit in front pocket--more than 30 names. List of 19 filled tabs 31 tabs present for 20-31 do not appear to have ever been filled. Tabbed items include: Effective Surveillance Program Memo dated 26 April 2010 then SNL LLNL and LANL responses then Requirements Workload Planning document of 22 Oct. 2010 followed by LLNL SRS KCP LANL PX SNL. Y12 NSO responses to the 22 Oct Memo followed by Summary of responses to 22 Oct Memo then followed by FYNSP responses from LLNL LANL and SNL followed by a Consolidated FYNSP responses. The 19th tab has the slides for workload meeting. Additional material in rear pocket: Surveillance Enterprise Governance 34 hard copy vugraphs 4 to a page--with some ink notations One page on NNSA Nuclear Weapons Surveillance Program 2 copies--one with notes on back One vugraph on FY 11 Surveillance Requirements and Over Targets with substantial notes Additional information on Consolidated Six Year Surveillance Requirements 12 sheets Greenaugh e-mail on Requirements workload 2 pages staples Illinger e-mail on Baselining New Surveillance Requirements 3 pages stapled Mangum e-mail on Surveillance Numbers 3 pages stapled 1 page on requires by site and funding program E-mail from Mangum on surveillance numbers 2 pages stapled with notes e-mail from Sinkular on NA 12 update 2 pages stapled with notes. Notes on November 5 2010 Goodrum Memo Teleconference and one page hardcopy vugraph on FY 11 Surveillance comparison. The use of data from surveillance of our nuclear weapons enables us to predict how the weapons will perform over time without nuclear explosive testing. This capability has improved significantly over the past decade and provides us with the capability to ensure an effective nuclear stockpile. Surveillance information is critical for the predictive models used in the annual nuclear weapon assessment process. These tools and the detailed quantitative modeling they support serve as key elements of the capability to maintain a safe secure and effective U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without underground nuclear explosive testing. The National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA annual assessment process has evolved significantly since the end of underground nuclear explosive testing to ensure an effective nuclear weapons stockpile. The current approach aims to achieve a comprehensive science-based understanding of nuclear weapon systems. Surveillance tools and models play critical roles in providing information essential to assessing weapon safety security and performance changes that would impact military effectiveness without performing underground nuclear explosive tests. These surveillance tools aid in the understanding of two conditions of weapons systems: the "as-built" and "as-aged" conditions. The "as-built" condition reflects the frequency and severity of original design or manufacturing defects. The "as-aged" condition reflects the evolution of age-related changes in materials components and subsystems that can alter performance. Over the last few years several advances in this area have contributed to a better understanding of the condition of our existing nuclear weapons and the ways in which the current condition could affect safety reliability or performance. Through the weapons surveillance program the U.S. has in-depth knowledge of the core components housed within weapons by using technologies such as nondestructive laser gas sampling and high-resolution computed tomography. System tests also assess the functionality of all major non-nuclear components. National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Programs unknown
200275230Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Programs 2002. Copy of Team Files. CD-R. Very good. This CD contains a treasure trove of information on High Explosive operations and facilities at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory the Los Alamos National Laboratory Sandia National Laboratories the Nevada Test Site and the Pantex Plant. This CD has the files that are excel spread sheets PDF files JPG files Power Point files and Word files. The material includes the scope team membership information from the sites information on sizing etc. This information was developed to address consolidation options between nuclear weapon laboratories and plants with an aim to reduce some costs. Major high explosive operations included research and development explosive testing detonator and small quantity production and 'main charge' production for nuclear weapons. Posted on-line--Los Alamos demonstrated the first use of plastic-bonded explosives in a nuclear explosion in 1956. This development allowed the shift from precision machined cast explosives to formulations containing high concentrations of high-energy density compounds with reduced sensitivity more uniformity and better mechanical characteristics. Since the 1960s Livermore has been researching and developing safer HE for Livermore-designed weapons. The plastic coating that binds the explosive granules typically 5 to 20% of each formulation by weight is what gives each PBX its distinctive characteristics. Pressing a PBX molding powder converts it into a solid mass with the polymer binder providing both mechanical rigidity and reduced sensitivity to accidental detonation. The choice of binder affects hardness safety and stability. The TATB-based formulations of Livermore's LX-17 and Los Alamos's PBX 9502 are "insensitive" high explosives IHE; others are termed "conventional." National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Programs unknown
2001809962001. Fourth Printing stated. Velobound. Very good. Various paginations approximately 180 pages. Illustrations color. Bibliography. Appendices A-K includes Glossary and Acronyms. Figures. Distribution memorandum laid in. In its fiscal year FY 2001 Energy and Water Development Appropriation Congress directed the National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA to complete a study that "includes conclusions as to whether the full-scale NIF National Ignition Facility is required in order to maintain the safety and reliability of the current nuclear weapons stockpile and whether alternatives to the NIF could achieve the objective of maintaining the safety and reliability of the current nuclear weapons stockpile." To meet this requirement the NNSA has conducted a detailed study of the role of high-energy-density physics HEDP and NIF in the Stockpile Stewardship Program SSP. The principal finding of this study is that a vital HEDP Program is an essential component of the SSP. Based on this finding the Office of Defense Programs DP recommends the continuation of the baseline HEDP Program including 192-beam NIF with the goal of achieving ignition. Section 3.4.6 addresses an aspect of nuclear weapons effects testing. Section 4.4 is entitled Weapons Effects. The SSP was established in response to the FY 1994 National Defense Authorization Act P.L. 103-160 Sect. 3138 which called on the Secretary of Energy to "establish a stewardship program to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons." In the absence of nuclear testing the SSP must: 1 support a focused multifaceted program to increase the understanding of the enduring stockpile; 2 predict detect and evaluate potential problems due to the aging of the stockpile; 3 refurbish and remanufacture weapons and components as required; and 4 maintain the science and engineering institutions needed to support the nation's nuclear deterrent now and in the future. The principal outcomes of the SSP are confidence in safety security and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons and a cadre of nuclear-skilled personnel underpinning nuclear deterrence. The NNSA national laboratories agree that a strong and diverse HEDP Program is an essential component of the SSP. An excellent understanding of high-energy-density physics is required to understand the operation of nuclear weapons. The fundamental requirements for the baseline HEDP Program are driven by meeting the needs of the stockpile and by a commitment to related broader national scientific interests. Based on these requirements the HEDP Program has developed a set of strategic goals in the following areas: weapons physics ignition high yield radiation effects basic science and supporting technologies. To determine if the HEDP Program is properly optimized to meet the needs of DP's mission DP invited senior members of the defense and scientific communities to examine high-energy-density activities conducted throughout the SSP. These study panel members were asked specifically to assess the role of high-energy-density physics within the SSP and to examine the facilities and program elements within the HEDP Program to assure that the goals of the SSP are met in the near and long term. Two areas that were not included directly in this study were HEDP activities within the Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign and the cost considerations associated with developing and operating the necessary experimental computational manufacturing and production capabilities required for the SSP. unknown
200179902Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 2001. Presumed First Edition First printing thus. Wraps. Very good. 19 13 pages. Mostly printed on both sides of a sheet. Sheets/project posters on several IPP projects are included at the back of this document. This year's report covers a year that involved a number of exciting developments in the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention IPP program. The program receives a significant vote of confidence for its commercialization focus with for successful IPP projects attracting $56 million in private venture capital funds. These funds were in addition to the already substantial contribution from U.S. industry partners who more than match U.S. government funding on each new IPP project. The IPP program also resumed operation in Kazakhstan and Ukraine adding the scientific talent of these countries to the technology resource base now available to U.S. industry partners. The program's nonproliferation objectives are met with increasing success as a growing number of former Soviet weapons scientists are engaged both in the course of ongoing work as well as in the jobs that are being created by successfully completed IPP projects. Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a central part of US national security policy. A principal instrument of the Department of Energy`s DOE`s program for securing weapons of mass destruction technology and expertise and removing incentives for scientists engineers and technicians in the newly independent states NIS of the former Soviet Union to go to rogue countries or assist terrorist groups is the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention IPP. IPP was initiated pursuant to the 1994 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. IPP is a nonproliferation program with a commercialization strategy. IPP seeks to enhance US national security and to achieve nonproliferation objectives by engaging scientists engineers and technicians from former NIS weapons institutes; redirecting their activities in cooperatively-developed commercially viable non-weapons related projects. These projects lead to commercial and economic benefits for both the NIS and the US IPP projects are funded in Russian Ukraine Kazakhstan and Belarus. This booklet offers an overview of the IPP program as well as a sampling of some of the projects which are currently underway. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation paperback
201376278Las Vegas: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies Office of Public Affairs 2013. Presumed First thus. DVD-RW. Very good. This contains dozens of photographs from the event in JPG format. There are multiple images in files titled: Day 1 Day 2 Day 2 Part 2 Dinner Dinner 2 Kearsarge GZ NSF Group Photo Steakhouse and U1a-Jasper. The United States part of the Joint Verification Experiment carried out in 1988 as the Kearsarge event in Operation Touchstone. Twenty-five years later before tensions increased between Russia and the United States a joint commemoration of the event was held at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site formerly the Nevada Test Site. This DVD contains photographs taken throughout the two day event. The objective of the JVE was to calibrate the seismic yield estimation capability of underground nuclear explosions conducted in both countries. It involved the unprecedented US on-site yield measurement of a Soviet nuclear explosion at its then nuclear test site in Kazakhstan and the reciprocal Soviet on-site yield measurement of a US nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Site. JVE provided the first opportunity for scientists from US and Soviet nuclear weapons laboratories to meet and work cooperatively. At the Nevada Test Site and at the follow-on experiment at the Soviet Semipalatinsk Test Site they developed confidence-building steps that made possible the ratification of the TTBT in 1990. Both Russians and Americans agree that cooperation between US and Soviet nuclear weapons scientists began with the JVE and the follow-on discussions on the TTBT verification mechanisms during the Geneva negotiations. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies, Office of Public Affairs unknown
201376279Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies Office of Public Affairs 2013. Presumed First thus. DVD-RW. Very good. This has two files. One of JVE historic photographs as a powerpoint presentation with about 160 images. The second file is a WMV format and is about a 40 minute video of Ambassador Paul Robinson's remarks shown at the commemoration. The United States part of the Joint Verification Experiment carried out in 1988 as the Kearsarge event in Operation Touchstone. Twenty-five years later before tensions increased between Russia and the United States a joint commemoration of the event was held at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site formerly the Nevada Test Site. The objective of the JVE was to calibrate the seismic yield estimation capability of underground nuclear explosions conducted in both countries. It involved the unprecedented US yield measurement of a Soviet nuclear explosion at its then nuclear test site in Kazakhstan and the reciprocal Soviet yield measurement of a US nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Site. JVE provided the first opportunity for scientists from US and Soviet nuclear weapons laboratories to meet and work cooperatively. At the Nevada Test Site and at the follow-on experiment at the Soviet Semipalatinsk Test Site they developed confidence-building steps that made possible the ratification of the TTBT in 1990. Both Russians and Americans agree that cooperation between US and Soviet nuclear weapons scientists began with the JVE and the follow-on discussions on the TTBT verification mechanisms during the Geneva negotiations. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies, Office of Public Affairs unknown
201376282Las Vegas NV: National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies Office of Public Affairs 2013. Presumed First thus. DVD-RW. Very good. Set of 6 DVDs. Volume 1 Welcome Ponomarev Paul Robinson Soloshin and Allen; Volume 2 Historic Panel: Aquilina Shubin Wilkes Hawkins; Volume 3 Historic Panel: Dunlop Turnbull Petrov Sandoval Zucca; Volume 4 Future Panel Browne Warner Wallace McDowell Kostyukov Aheleznov Loparev; Volume 5 Shubin and Future Recommendations PanelKickuck Hecker Lehman Hunter; and Volume 6 Voloshin Vic Reis Next Steps Panel: Cook Harrington Gottemoeller Kamenskikh and Document Signing and Conference Close. The United States part of the Joint Verification Experiment carried out in 1988 as the Kearsarge event in Operation Touchstone. Twenty-five years later a joint commemoration of the event was held at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site formerly the Nevada Test Site. The objective of the JVE was to calibrate the seismic yield estimation capability of underground nuclear explosions conducted in both countries. It involved the unprecedented US yield measurement of a Soviet nuclear explosion at its then nuclear test site in Kazakhstan and the reciprocal Soviet yield measurement of a US nuclear explosion at the Nevada Test Site JVE provided the first opportunity for scientists from US and Soviet nuclear weapons laboratories to meet and work cooperatively. At the Nevada Test Site and at the follow-on experiment at the Soviet Semipalatinsk Test Site they developed confidence-building steps that made possible the ratification of the TTBT in 1990. National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office/National Security Technologies, Office of Public Affairs unknown
201376280National Nuclear Security Administration 2013. Presumed First thus. CD-RW. Very good. This has one file with 27 powerpoint items on it. These include presentations by Shubin Loparev Zheleznov McDowell Wallace Warner Lehman Hecker Voloshin Reis Zucca Sandoval Petrov Felske Hawkins and Ponomarev plus panel related material and the JVE coin. Among the topics covered include Trust but Verify Optimizing Rosatom JVE Results Seismic Hydrodynamic Monitoring Geophysics Geology Technical Elements Next Steps and Future Cooperation. The United States part of the Joint Verification Experiment carried out in 1988 as the Kearsarge event in Operation Touchstone. Twenty-five years later before tensions increased between Russia and the United States a joint commemoration of the event was held at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site formerly the Nevada Test Site. JVE provided the first opportunity for scientists from US and Soviet nuclear weapons laboratories to meet and work cooperatively. At the Nevada Test Site and at the follow-on experiment at the Soviet Semipalatinsk Test Site they developed confidence-building steps that made possible the ratification of the TTBT in 1990. Both Russians and Americans agree that cooperation between US and Soviet nuclear weapons scientists began with the JVE and the follow-on discussions on the TTBT verification mechanisms during the Geneva negotiations. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
201376281National Nuclear Security Administration 2013. Presumed First thus. CD-RW. Very good. This has one file with 27 powerpoint items on it. In Russian: These appear to include presentations by Shubin Loparev Zheleznov McDowell Wallace Warner Lehman Hecker Voloshin Reis Zucca Sandoval Petrov Felske Hawkins and Ponomarev plus panel related material and the JVE coin. Among the topics covered include Trust but Verify Optimizing Rosatom JVE Results Seismic Hydrodynamic Monitoring Geophysics Geology Technical Elements Next Steps and Future Cooperation. The United States part of the Joint Verification Experiment carried out in 1988 as the Kearsarge event in Operation Touchstone. Twenty-five years later before tensions increased between Russia and the United States a joint commemoration of the event was held at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site formerly the Nevada Test Site. JVE provided the first opportunity for scientists from US and Soviet nuclear weapons laboratories to meet and work cooperatively. At the Nevada Test Site and at the follow-on experiment at the Soviet Semipalatinsk Test Site they developed confidence-building steps that made possible the ratification of the TTBT in 1990. Both Russians and Americans agree that cooperation between US and Soviet nuclear weapons scientists began with the JVE and the follow-on discussions on the TTBT verification mechanisms during the Geneva negotiations. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
201180419Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration 2011. Presumed First thus. Three Ring Binder. Good. Includes sections on LANL ICF LLNL ICF SNL ICF LANL ICF LLNL SC NNSS SC and SNL SC. Includes information on ICF Ignition Diagnostics Facility Operations Pulsed Power Science Campaign Primary Assessment Technologies Dynamic Materials Properties Advanced Radiography Secondary Assessment Technologies and Advanced Certification. Some of the cost breakdown is by: Chargebacks Purchases Travel Labor Equipment Training Subcontracts Other Direct Costs Material Institutional costs Service Center and Overheads. This is a rare snapshot into the range of expenditures and the monthly progression of expenditures. Cost analysis is a comparison of costs. Costs used to prepare financial statements are not the same as those used to control operations. Costs may be controllable or non-controllable and are subject to time periods and constraints. For example controllable costs are those the manager may authorize. However costs that may be able to be controlled over the long-term may not be controllable in the short-term.<br/><br/>Total cost is the relationship between production quantity and costs expressed as: Total cost = Fixed Cost Variable Cost Output<br/><br/>Costs are classified according to their behavior. A cost's behavior is how the cost responds to changes in the level of the business activity. Costs are broadly divided into variable costs and fixed costs. For example the total variable cost increases and decreases in relation to the changes in business activity levels. Conversely fixed costs are not affected by business activity level changes remaining the same throughout. National Nuclear Security Administration unknown
201080986Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Defense Programs 2010. Presumed First Edition First printing --number of copies assembled is unknown. Three Ring Binder. Very good. The Table of Contents is: MTP 32 vugraphs 4 per page PS 59 vugraphs 4 per page KCP 20 vugraphs 1 per page PX 55 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page SRS 41 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page Y12 41 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page LANL 38 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page LLNL 48 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page SNL 158 vugraphs--various paginations--1 per page Agenda 3 pages and Participant list 1 page. In the back pocket is a November 2010 Updated to the NDAA of FY 2010 Section 1251 Report and a stapled seven sheet compilation of Budget Requirements. Some material was marked Official Use Only but this limitation is understood to not longer apply due to the passage of time and public dissemination of comparable information. Approximately 2 inches of material in the binder. The Production Support Program is a DSW Program that funds multi-system manufacturing-based activities that provide individual site production capabilities and capacity for the LEPs LLC production weapon surveillance and weapon assembly and disassembly operations. The Production Support Program also enables the modernization of production capabilities to improve efficiency and ensure that manufacturing operations meet future requirements. This includes maintenance/calibration services for manufacturing operations to meet DoD War Reserve requirements. Collectively these activities directly support execution of systems engineering concepts and production integration. The Production Support Program provides DSW with the capability to conduct life extension work stockpile surveillance dismantlement work neutron generator production and detonator cable assembly production. The Management Technology and Production MTP Program's work scope is a multi-system production-based program that promotes nuclear security enterprise integration and enhances efficiency. MTP activities provide the products components and/or services for multi-weapon system surveillance laboratory/flight test data collection and analysis; weapons reliability reporting to DoD; DSW requirements tracking and execution; management and operation; and stockpile planning. The MTP Program funds plant and laboratory personnel to sustain the stockpile through activities related to surveillance; weapons response process improvements; engineering authorizations; safety assessments; use control technologies; containers; base spares; studies and assessments for nuclear operation safety; production of weapon components for use in multiple weapons systems; and transportation/handling gear for use in multiple weapons systems. The MTP Program also includes activities that benefit the nuclear security enterprise mission as differentiated from Production Support activities which support internal site-specific production missions. National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Programs unknown
201875546Washington DC: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Safety Infrastructure and Operations 2018. Presumed First Edition First printing. Spiral bound. Very good. 58 pages. Illustrations color. Map. Acronyms. Clear plastic sheets at front and back covers. This 2018 Master Asset Plan MAP lays out the National Nuclear Security Administration's NNSA infrastructure vision and highlights strategic investments being made to achieve it. It is an update to the first-ever 2017 MAP which described how NNSA's infrastructure supports it's unique mission requirements and the gaps and mission risks inherent in that infrastructure. Safe reliable and modern infrastructure at NNSA's national laboratories and production plants is absolutely essential to accomplish our vital national security mission and ensure the well-being of our workforce. As the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states there is no margin for further delay in improving the state of NNSA's infrastructure. Significant and sustained investments will be required during the next quarter century to recapitalize and revitalize the nuclear security enterprise. The Master Asset Plan assembles data into a single report that presents an integrated view of NNSA's infrastructure strategy. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations unknown